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ABSTRACT
Cross-cultural research on moral development has documented reliable cultural
differences in people's evaluations of moral and immoral actions. Prosocial actions are
typically viewed as more obligatory and less discretionary in collectivistic cultures relative
to individualistic cultures. While past research mostly focused on moral judgments, it
largely neglected moral emotions. The present study was aimed at investigating self- and
other-evaluative emotions following (im) moral actions in different situational and cultural
contexts. It investigated moral emotion expectancies of Canadian and Chinese adolescents
and young adults across different situational contexts. For each culture, 179 Canadian and
193 Chinese adolescents from grade levels 7-8, 10-11 and 1 -2n year university filled out
a questionnaire. Participants were provided with 16 different scenarios depicting moral
and immoral actions of self and others in either prosocial or moral contexts. Emotional
expectations about themselves and others were assessed following each scenario by asking
adolescents to rate various positively as well as negatively charged self- and other
evaluative emotions (pride, satisfaction, guilt, shame, admiration, respect, contempt,
anger). Obligation/ discretion ratings and Horizontal/Vertical Collectivism-Individualism
scales were measured. The main assumptions of cultural differences were confirmed in the
present study that Chinese were more likely to hold a collectivist cultural view with more
obligations in prosocial contexts and Canadians were more likely to hold an individualist
view with more personal discretion in prosocial contexts. In a mixed model ANOVA,
significant interactions between situational context (prosocial/moral), types of action (rule
abiding/rule conforming) and culture were found for both self- and other-evaluative
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emotions. Canadian participants expressed more intense negative self-evaluative emotions
relative to Chinese participants, in particular in the prosocial context. By contrast, Chinese
participants expressed more negative other-evaluative emotions than Canadian
participants when confronted with the rule-violating behavior of others in both prosocial
and moral contexts. However, regression analyses did not find cross-cultural differences in
predicting other-evaluative emotions from self-evaluative emotions in prosocial contexts.
Overall, the study points to systematic cultural differences in moral emotions; however,
these differences were only partially attributable to moral judgment.
iii
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Moral Emotion Expectancies in Adolescence: A Cross-Cultural Perspective
Morality has been heavily investigated in psychology over the last fifty years, since
Lawrence Kohlberg initially proposed his stage theory of moral development. Kohlberg
(1969) primarily focused on independent, individual processes of moral decision-making.
Consequently, as moral reasoning advances through Kohlberg' s developmentally defined
stages, an individual's moral reasoning is supposed to become less dependent on outside
influences (Trevino & Youngblood. 1990).
However, Kohlberg's view has been challenged by the idea that morality is an
interdependent and connected phenomenon (Gilligan, 1977). This explanation has
emphasized the social-cultural influences that affect an individual's morality. Precisely
how social and cultural variations influence individuals' moral development remains
unclear. Recently, cultural psychologists have paid great attention to the psychological
details of cultural variations. A major variable distinguishing particular cultures is that of
individualism versus collectivism. How persons are defined, how they live and work or
study with each other, and which type of morality they hold are the main contents of
individualism and collectivism (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Research on culture is important in moral development because it not only allows
the study of the universality of psychological theories of moral development, but also
expansion of the psychological constructs and process explanations invoked in
understanding moral outlooks (Miller, 2007a). Cross-cultural research on social
attribution has demonstrated cross-cultural differences in social inferences. In particular,
it has been found that there tends to be a greater emphasis on explaining social actions
and emotions in terms of dispositional traits of the person in individualist cultures,
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whereas collectivist cultures are more weighted in social attribution to social role
relations and other contextual factors (Miller, 1984; Miller, 2007a; Miller, Chakravarthy
& Rekha, 2008; Shweder & Bourne, 1984).
Emotional attributions also require a strong cognitive component besides moral
reasoning and judgment, when people face a moral conflict, and the relationship between
moral actions and emotion is complex (Krettenauer, Malti & Sokol, 2008). For example,
if people violate social standards, rules or goals, and attribute their transgression to
themselves, they feel a sense of guilt or shame. Furthermore, people feel pride if they
face a successful evaluation of a specific action and attribute this action to internal factors
such as effort (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2009). Even though the development of moral
emotion is inevitably set in a socio-cultural history, most research on moral emotions has
been conducted in Western societies. The complex interaction between moral emotions
and cultural experiences has not been addressed in the research. For example, what
aspects of moral emotions are due to obligation and what to personal discretion in
interpersonal responsibility, and what are the specific connections of culture to
experiencing the norms as emotionally salient? How do cultural processes interact with
people's moral emotions when they face either moral transgressions or prosocial
situations?
In the following, in order to address the important relationship between moral
emotions and cultural processes, three major steps were taken in this introduction. First,
the question on what role culture plays in morality in general will be discussed. For
example, benevolence and concern for the well-being of other members of the
community are central moral values in the Chinese tradition (Bond, 1996). Research
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indicates that Canadian mothers primarily encourage autonomy, whereas Chinese parents
primarily encourage connectedness (Chen & French, 2008). Second, different domains
of interpersonal morality will be discussed that have been shown to differ across cultures.
In individualist cultures, prosocial actions which relate to positive morality are
considered less obligatory and are more a matter of personal discretion as compared to
collectivistic cultures (Krettenauer & Johnson, 2009). Third, research on moral emotion
expectancies will be presented and its limitations discussed. Based on these discussions
the purpose of the present study is then outlined and specific hypotheses are formulated.
These hypotheses address cultural differences between Chinese and Canadian adolescents
with regard to positively charged versus negatively charged self-evaluative and other-
evaluative emotions in the context of prosocial and moral action. In addition, the
hypotheses will address the role of culture as moderator in the relationship between self-
evaluative and other-evaluative emotion expectancies.
Culture and Morality
Over time, researchers in cross-cultural psychology learned that the distinction
between individualism and collectivism is less marked than initially assumed and that
there is room for some mixture between individualism and collectivism (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). Still, Western and non-Western cultures differ in having a principal
emphasis of one type of orientation or the other (Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987).
According to this concept, the United States is commonly identified as an individualistic
society, and also individualism is prevalent in a number of other countries, such as
Australia, Canada, England, and New Zealand (Triandis, 1990). However, collectivistic
cultures predominate in China, Japan, India, and the Middle East as well as Africa, Latin
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America, and Southern Europe (Triandis, 1990). It is well known that the central idea of
individualistic cultures is the concept of the person as an autonomous agent, whereas the
central idea of collectivism is interconnected and interdependent relationships among
group members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). A core characteristic of individualistic
cultures is keeping distance from others and being independent of the social environment
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, people's lives are focused on thinking
independently, paying less attention to social conventions and showing more resistance to
authority (Triandis, 1990). By contrast, people in collectivistic cultures are considered as
working together for the same social goals, thinking of others, paying attention to
tradition and duty, and obeying authority; therefore, status or role distinctions prevail and
social harmony is preferred in these cultures (Triandis, 1990).
Morality is regarded as a part of the development of both individualist and
collectivist cultures. Individualism is related to a "rights-based" morality while
collectivism is connected with a "duty-based" morality (Bersoff & Miller, 1 993).
Moreover, in collectivism, the social duties and obligations of each single individual are
more important than his or her own civil rights and freedoms (Shweder, Mahapatra &
Miller, 1987).
This way of differentiating types of morality not only shows different standards of
morality, but also gives us insight into cultural variations (Shweder, 1982). Regretfully,
parricide, infanticide, suicide, polygamy, arranged marriages and inequalities are also
parts of family relationships in Indian culture (Shweder, 1982). Nevertheless, if a culture
has a morality based on duties or obligations, it naturally imposes higher standards
regarding social harmony or keeping everything orderly (Shweder, 1982). Based on this
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perspective, Shweder et al. (1987) compared the judgments of people from India and the
United States. The Brahmans, who were Hindus, were chosen to represent India. They
were living in an old temple town and their activities included temple duty. Their status
was defined by their role in the ritual activities of the temple. In Shweder et al. 's study
(1987), participants from India and America were presented with many descriptions of
actions that could possibly be argued to be moral or social transgressions. Different
judgments were found between Indians and Americans. Religious considerations were
correlated with the judgments from Indians. For example, in India, a widow does not eat
fish, wear jewelry and bright clothing, and a son does not get a haircut or eat chicken
immediately after his father's death. Moreover, Indians think that if they violate these
practices, they do serious wrong, but Americans do not.
Domain specificity in interpersonal morality: obligatory versus discretionary
Miller (2007b) defined interpersonal morality as a positive morality referring to the
responsibility of meeting the needs of others. Cross-cultural research has shown that
cultures give different priorities to justice-related concerns and to interpersonal
responsibilities. Comparing Asian and Western cultures, Bersoff and Miller (1993)
showed that individuals from India were more concerned with issues of care and gave
greater priority to interpersonal responsibilities than American individuals. In contrast,
Americans were more concerned with moral rules and issues ofjustice, and gave priority
to formal moral obligations. Thus, Indians judged helping to be obligatory independent of
the type of relationship, while Americans judged helping friends to be more obligatory
than helping strangers.
This study was undertaken among middle-class European-American children and
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adults sampled from New Haven, Connecticut and among middle-class Hindu-Indian
children and adults sampled from Mysore City in Southern India (Bersoff & Miller,
1993). Using standard back-translation techniques, Indian researchers conducted data
collection in India in the local language of Kannada. Recruited from a setting that
emphasizes relatively traditional Hindu-Indian cultural belief and practices, the Indian
sample represents a cultural group emphasizing what has been characterized as
interdependent cultural views of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Recruited from an
urban European-American community, the American sample, in turn, represents a
cultural group that has been characterized as emphasizing more independent cultural
values.
Since persons in individualistic cultures are said to emphasize the role of personal
choice and individualism in interpersonal obligation, it was expected by Bersoff and
Miller (1993) that Americans' assessments of interpersonal responsibilities would be
considerably affected by the emotional closeness of the relationship. Reflecting the
emphasis on the duty-based nature of interpersonal commitments held in collectivist
settings, it was expected that the Indians' assessments of interpersonal obligations would
remain relatively unaffected by the closeness of the relationship. On the whole, the
findings indicated that Americans' evaluations of interpersonal responsibilities were more
affected by emotional considerations than were those of Indians. Nevertheless, variations
were also found within both groups. Among Americans, parent-child relationships were
judged to cause obligation regardless of the affective closeness of the relationship.
Among Indians, relationships between adult colleagues were regarded as entailing less of
an obligation if the adults in the relationship felt distant and did not like each other
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(Bersoff & Miller, 1993). Miller (1984) suggested that these differences arise from
different moral codes, where Indians give priority to social duties, while Americans give
priority to individual rights and personal choice. Similarly, Shweder et al, (1987) claimed
that Indians perceive interpersonal responsibilities as duties, while US Americans see
them as more voluntary.
The cross-cultural difference between obligatory and discretionary morality is even
more salient in prosocial actions. In Miller and Bersoff (1992)' s cross-cultural study
between Americans and Indians, they found that in both cultures, helping tended to be
seen as highly desirable and as a perceived responsibility. However, Americans had the
dominant tendency to treat helping as a matter for personal decision making, whereas
Indians tended to see helping as an issue that is legitimately regulated. In other words,
Americans emphasized personal freedom of choice when considering helping others in
need, whereas Indians considered helping more a moral obligation. In their study, a
sample of American and Hindu Indian children and adults were questioned regarding
their attitudes toward prosocial situations. They compared them with regard to
hypothetical scenarios, in which, for selfish reasons, agents failed to act prosocially to
someone experiencing high, moderate or minor need. In a between-subject design, they
portrayed the agent's relationship to others as either that of parents, best friends or
strangers. Culture specific versions of the scenarios were used, with interviews among the
Indian sample conducted in the local language of Kannada by native researchers. Moral
domain was assessed based on responses to objective obligation and legitimate regulation
criterion probes. The results indicated cross-cultural differences in the conceptualization
of social responsibilities. Indians more frequently viewed responsiveness to another's
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needs as an objective obligation than did Americans in all cases that involved minor
needs or the moderately serious needs of friends or strangers. Cross-cultural differences
in perceptions of legitimate regulation were observed, with Indians more frequently
viewing behaviors as legitimately regulated than did Americans. This was also true in
cases involving the moderately serious needs of children or the extreme needs of friends
or strangers.
Jia, Hansen, Clark and Li (2008) replicated Miller's study by comparing Canadian
and Chinese university students about interpersonal responsibilities toward parents,
friends, strangers and global issues in different type of prosocial (helping, donating and
volunteering) and antisocial situations (lying, cheating and stealing). The Chinese sample
represented a collectivist culture and the Canadian sample represented an individualist
culture, with these groups expected to maintain a similar pattern as Indians vs. Americans
in Miller's study. Jia et al (2008) found that Canadians and Chinese hold different views
of interpersonal responsibilities in regard to certain types of prosocial situations. Even
though both Canadian and Chinese young adults evaluated failure to act prosocially as
morally bad, Chinese evaluated most scenarios as morally worse than did Canadians.
Most importantly, obligatory and discretionary morality in situations of prosocial actions
differed cross-culturally: Chinese considered the issue of failing to help more of a moral
issue than did Canadians. Conversely, more Canadians considered the issue of failing to
help to be a matter of personal choice. Canadians emphasized personal freedom of choice
when considering helping others (friends, in-group/out-group strangers and global issues
such as volunteer in a medical position) in need; Chinese considered helping more of a
moral obligation.
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Research on the domain specificity of interpersonal morality demonstrated that
moral rules differ with regard to their obligatoriness. In both collectivist and individualist
cultures, strict obligations are usually related to issues of negative morality such as
stealing, hitting and cheating. By contrast, prosocial actions are usually related to issues
of positive morality such as helping, donating and volunteering that require less
obligation and are deemed more a matter of personal choice (in individualist cultures)
(Krettenauer & Johnston, 2009). This difference between strictly obligatory versus
discretionary moral actions was well documented in previous research (Miller & Bersoff,
1992). However, the implication of this difference for emotional and motivational
processes in prosocial or antisocial behaviors has been largely neglected. Piaget (1970)
assumed that emotional experiences are associated with social interaction processes
which influence a child's emerging construction of norms. Therefore, the question of
whether the development of moral emotions is affected by cultural differences in social
relationship and rule understanding needs to be investigated from an integrative
perspective that combines a developmental with a cross-cultural approach.
Development of Moral Emotions and Emotion Expectancies
Moral emotion expectancies (MEE) are anticipated emotions when transgressing a
moral rule or conforming to it. Research in developmental psychology suggests that
children have the cognitive capacities to experience empathy as well as the moral
emotions of guilt and shame well before the age of seven years (Harris, 1989). However,
many younger children do not anticipate these emotions in the context of moral actions
before the age of seven to eight years (Arsenio, Gold & Adams, 2006). Instead, younger
children tend to attribute positive emotions to someone who transgresses a moral rule in
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order to achieve a personal goal (Arsenio, Gold & Adams, 2006). This phenomenon has
been called the "happy victimizer expectancy".
The first systematic study into this expectancy was conducted by Nunner-Winkler
and Sodian (1988). They examined four, six and eight year old children's attributions of
emotions to an actor who had stolen something without being caught and to an actor who
had the temptation to steal but resisted eventually. In the moral-judgment task which
assessed children's rule understanding, the experimenters asked "Is the protagonist
allowed to do this (e.g. take the sweets or chestnuts)? Why or Why not?" The results
showed that almost all children answered "no" to the question testing their rule
understanding and were able to give adequate moral reasons. In the emotion attribution
task, the experimenters asked "How does the protagonist feel now and why?" by showing
pictures of happy and sad faces. 74% of four year olds and 40% of six year olds, but only
10%) of eight year old children judged the protagonist to feel happy (positive emotion)
after stealing. By the age of eight a large majority of children had coordinated moral
judgment and emotion expectancies and thus, was able to anticipate negative self-
evaluative emotions following a moral transgression.
One of the major critiques of Nunner-Winkler' s and Sodian's studies addresses
issues of their interview procedure. The typical question in their emotion attribution task
was: "How does the victimizer or protagonist feel?" following pictures of either happy or
sad faces. In addition, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian focused on emotion attributions
towards the victimizer but not towards victims (Krettenauer, Malti & Sokol, 2008). Other
research showed that young children are more likely to spontaneously select positive
rather negative emotions in various social cognitive tasks (Harter & Buddin, 1987).
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Children may have attributed mixed emotions to victimizers, but without further probing
they were biased towards- selecting a positive emotion outcome over a negative one
(Arsenio & Kramer, 1992).
Arsenio and Kramer (1992) investigated some of these issues by using a
quantitative emotion rating (five point scales) and by controlling for the participant's role
in the scenario (attribution toward victims or toward the victimizer). They found a highly
significant effect for participant's role. This indicated that children from an early age were
able to distinguish between emotional consequences of moral transgressions for victims
and victimizers. Children rated victims as feeling more negatively than victimizers. In the
second part of their study, they manipulated the saliency of victim harm and included
additional probe questions regarding victimizers' emotions, such as "Do you think the
actor could be feeling anything else?" It was demonstrated that none of the four year old
children changed their original attribution that victimizers would feel happy, so they
appear to be uninfluenced by the probes. However, six and eight year old children often
selected alternative-valence emotions for victimizers but not for victims. Taken together,
all four years old children expected victimizers to be happy without any influence of
probes and manipulations. Six years old children expected additional negative emotions
in victimizers after probing. Eight years old children expected mixed and conflicted
emotions for victimizers. Thus, even with more sophisticated methods it turned out that
the initial findings documented by Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) are robust:
Younger children tend to attribute positive emotions to a moral wrongdoer who
transgresses a moral rule in order to achieve a desired goal, whereas older children are
better able to coordinate moral knowledge and emotion understanding and as a
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consequence tend to expect negative self-evaluative emotions following a moral
transgression.
Moral emotion expectancies as studied in the happy-victimizer research were
shown to be systematically associated with moral behavior. Arsenio, Gold and Adams
(2004) demonstrated that aggressive adolescents expected more positive and less negative
emotions than non-aggressive adolescents when engaging in proactive aggression as
compared with reactive aggression. Furthermore, Arsenio, Cooperman and Lover (2000)
found children with higher levels of aggression-related happiness (children expected
happy emotions in scenarios where a peer deliberately knocked over a block structure)
were more likely to initiate aggression and were less accepted by peers. In a similar vein,
Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) found that the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions
predicted adolescents' self-reported delinquent behaviour, even when social desirability,
gender, and age were statistically controlled. Malti, Gasser and Buchmann (2009) studied
kindergarten and elementary school children who were selected as aggressive or prosocial
based on teacher ratings. Compared with prosocial children, aggressive children tended to
attribute fewer negative emotions to a moral transgressor. All in all, the relationship
between emotion expectancies and behavior indicates that the happy victimizer
phenomenon reflects important individual differences in moral functioning and moral
motivation.
Moral Emotion Expectancies in Adolescence and the Issue of Context Dependency
Only a few studies have investigated MEE in adolescence so far. These studies
mainly focused on emotional expectancies in delinquent adolescents in a comparison to
non-delinquent teenagers, but did not consider broader developmental and contextual
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influences on moral emotion expectancies (Krettenauer et al., 2008). Krettenauer and
Eichler (2006) investigated adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions following a moral
transgression by extending research with children on the happy-victimizer phenomenon.
They argued that the developmental nature of moral emotion expectancies is
controversial because some researchers did not find substantial differences between
responses of young adults and older children (Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1993). This may
imply that there is no general developmental trend in moral emotion expectancies in
adolescence. Yet, Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) found that the intensity of self-
attributed moral emotions gradually increased from grade nine to 13 for some moral
infractions under study, but not for all. However, the nature of this context specificity in
developmental change could not be further clarified since the study used only four
hypothetical scenarios (false testimony, absconding from an accident, not returning found
a wallet and stealing) designed to represent a broad range of moral issues.
Arsenio, Gold and Adams (2004) argued that specific types of situations need to be
given more attention, with a broad mix of different socio-moral events that might trigger
different emotion expectancies. The authors demonstrated that adolescents' moral
emotion expectancies depend on the nature of aggressive and .nonaggressive events.
Behaviorally disruptive adolescents attributed more positive and less negative emotions
when engaging in proactive aggression than a comparison group of typical adolescents.
Regarding situational specificity, they used a total of 20 brief vignettes of nonaggressive
situations designed to elicit emotion expectancies of either happiness, sadness, anger, fear
or a mixture of sadness and anger (four stories were chosen for each of the five emotion
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categories). However, for the aggressive events they only used three vignettes from a
previous study (Arsenio et al., 2004).
Another study by Saelen and Markovits (2008) looked at the contextual variation in
adolescents' attribution of guilt (as a moral emotion), satisfaction, and fear (as nonmoral
emotions) and their expectations of the probability of the nonmoral action being taken
involving situations of potential moral transgression. Two different situations were
examined: one described the opportunity of stealing money from a lost wallet (break a
moral rule) and the other examined a situation where a promise between two peers could
be broken for egoistic reasons (break a social contract) in a Bicycle scenario. They also
examined two specific variables in the stories. In the first, the main actors were depicted
either as friends or acquaintances. In the second, situations were described as having
either few or many passersby. It was found that different forms of contextual factors,
except the relative number ofpassersby, resulted in a different weighting of emotion
attributions. For example, participants attributed a higher level of both guilt and fear in
the Bicycle scenario than in the Wallet scenario. This result clearly indicates that emotion
attributions are affected by situational contexts in the two scenarios, for example, the
relationship between the actor and the victim in the situation.
Finally, Sy, Demeis and Scheinfield (2003) studied contextual variations in socio-
moral events by investigating four and five year old children's assessment of the
emotional consequences (happiness on a five-point scale) in prosocial situations (helping
and sharing), victimization (stealing and harming) and the situations of failures to act
prosocially (fail to help and fail to share) across the conditions of teacher presence or
absence. They found that children's emotional ratings for failures to act prosocially are
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different from their emotion ratings for prosocial and victimization situations, particularly
when considering the presence or absence of a teacher observer in the story. Even though
this study pointed out the importance of contextual influences on children's
understanding of various socio-moral events, it is not clear how participants attributed
other emotion ratings such as pride, shame and so on other than happiness. It is also not
clear that this contextual differentiation among these three socio-moral events would
generalize to other, non-school environments, and other forms of social interaction.
Probably the most systematic study into context dependencies of emotion
attributions in adolescence was done by Krettenauer and Johnston (2009). This study
analyzed negatively charged self-evaluative emotions following a moral transgression as
is typically done in happy victimizer research with children. At the same time, it also
investigated adolescents' positively charged moral emotion expectancies when acting
morally. These two types of actions were studied in different situational contexts that
varied with regard to their obligatoriness. Positively versus negatively charged moral
emotion expectancies systematically varied across situational contexts. In prosocial
contexts (people are presented with an opportunity to help others), positively charged
emotion expectancies (pride) after a moral action were higher than in temptation contexts
(people feel tempted to break a moral rule out of egoistic desires).
By contrast, when transgressing a moral rule, negatively charged emotion
expectancies (guilt) were more pronounced in temptation contexts than in prosocial
contexts. Thus, Krettenauer and Johnston (2009) found an asymmetrical relationship
between positively and negatively charged self-evaluative emotions in different contexts.
According to their findings, an individual expects pride when he/she experiences a sense
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of accomplishment (for instance when he/she evaluates his/her own behavior as
outstanding compared to others or when an action required a significant amount of
effort). These appraisals produce a sense of accomplishment that is necessary for the
experience or expectation of pride. However, none of them are required for the feeling of
guilt or shame. Negative self evaluative-emotions require a sense of responsibility and
obligation in terms of control over an action outcome, but not necessarily a sense of
accomplishment. Krettenauer and Johnston (2009) suggested that a sense of
accomplishment is more likely to be experienced in situations where an action is
supererogatory rather than strictly obligatory, i.e., in prosocial contexts where it is up to
the individual to decide whether he/she wants to perform a moral action or not (at least in
Western cultures).
To the extent that the obligatoriness of an action reflects cultural differences,
culture might systematically influence people's emotion expectancies. As described
above, cross-cultural research indicated that prosocial actions are considered more a
matter of personal choice in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures (Miller
& Bersoff, 1994; Jia, et al, 2008), and thus might be more likely associated with a sense
of personal accomplishment. As a consequence, people in western cultures should be
more likely to experience and expect positively charged self-evaluative emotions in
prosocial situations. By contrast, since prosocial actions are considered more obligatory
in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures, failing to act prosocially might
trigger stronger negatively charged emotion expectancies in collectivistic cultures than in
individualistic cultures. A different finding can be expected for strictly obligatory rules
that are typically related to aspects of negative morality in collectivistic as well as in
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individualistic societies (Miller, 2007a; Miller, 2007b). In this context, negatively
charged self-evaluative emotions can be expected to be equally strong in both cultures,
whereas positively charged emotions might be less strong consistently across cultures.
Self-evaluative and other-evaluative emotions
One major perspective regarding self- and other-attribution has been left out in
research on moral emotion expectancies. The question how the self might feel about
OTHERS engaging in moral or immoral actions has not been considered so far. The most
influential study which examined "other-evaluative" emotions in the moral domain was
conducted by Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt (1999). They hypothesized specific
linkages between the other-evaluative emotions: contempt, anger, and disgust, and three
moral codes as described by Shweder, Much, Mahapatra and Part (1997): community,
autonomy and divinity. Rozin et al. (1999) asked what you would feel if you were
observing certain behaviors such as "a person is seeing someone steal a purse from a
blind person". They found a universal trend in both Japanese and Americans that actions
that were a violation of the community ethic (transgression of duty or respect) were most
likely to elicit contempt; actions that were violations of the autonomy ethic (transgression
of personal rights) were most likely to elicit anger; whereas violations of the divinity
ethic (transgression of purity) were most likely to elicit disgust. Even though Rozin et al
(1999) did not find any significant cultural differences, they assumed that social hierarchy
in Japan should lead to a greater salience of the community ethic in the Japanese sample.
They also suggested that results should be gathered from individuals other than university
students and from individuals in other cultures that have moral codes different from the
United States (such as India and China).
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Laham, Chopra, Lalljee and Brian (2009) replicated and extended the emotion-
specificity hypothesis of moral reactions proposed by Rozin et al. (1999), by examining
emotional reactions to autonomy (rights) and community (hierarchy) transgressions in
Indian and British university students. Emotional reactions (anger, contempt, distress,
frustration, disgust, shame, disappointment and revulsion) were assessed toward
autonomy and community transgressions by asking what participants feel about others
engaging in such behaviors. According to Miller and Bersoff (1994), issues relating to
social rule obligations are more likely to be viewed as moral by Indians than by
Americans. Laham et al' s (2009) study supports this view. They found that autonomy
transgressions evoked similarly negative reactions in both Indian and British participants,
whereas Indians showed greater affective reactions in regards to violations of community
ethics than did British people.
Similar to research on moral emotion expectancies, research on other-evaluative
emotions so far has focused mostly on negatively charged emotions such as anger,
contempt and disgust. An important category of emotional experience, namely positively
charged other-evaluative emotions such as admiration, awe or respect has been
completely left out (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007). It is unlikely that positively
charged other-evaluative emotions simply mirror negatively charged emotions, so that
individuals experience positively charged other-evaluative emotions when observing
someone engaging in moral actions to the same extent they would experience negatively
charged emotions when observing someone not performing these actions. Instead, it can
be assumed that for other-evaluative emotions, a similar asymmetry between positively
and negatively charged emotions exists as has been documented for self-evaluative
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emotions by Krettenauer and Johnston (2009). Thus, actions that are beyond the call of
duty and in this sense supererogatory likely trigger more positively charged other-
evaluative emotions (e.g. admiration) than actions that are perceived as strictly obligatory
and expected from everyone. By contrast, negatively charged other-evaluative emotions
can be expected to be stronger when observing someone violating a strictly obligatory
moral norm than a prosocial obligation. As the evaluation of an action as strictly
obligatory or supererogatory varies across cultures, culture might interact with context
dependencies of positively versus negatively charged other-evaluative emotions.
Research on the development of moral emotion expectancies in childhood and
adolescence following the happy-victimizer paradigm has largely neglected other-
evaluative emotions so far. There is only a study by Malti and Keller (2009) that
compared emotion attributions of Chinese children with emotion attributions of Icelandic
children. Malti and Keller (2009) found that children from a western culture (Iceland)
identified more with the story character and projected their own feelings onto this
character, whereas Chinese children tended to take the perspective of a "generalized
other" when making emotion attributions to self or others. Strikingly, this finding
resonates with social-psychological research on emotion inferences by Cohen and Gunz
(2002). They measured emotion inferences by asking participants to recall one memory
with a strong emotion of shame for self, contempt, anger, fear, sympathy and sadness for
someone and rated 30 facial expressions with the six emotions. They found that
Easterners are more likely to infer others' emotions by generalizing from a third person
perspective on how the other person would feel when viewing his/her own behavior from
the perspective of a generalized other. By contrast, Westerners are more likely to attribute
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their own emotions to others, a process called egocentric projection (Cohen & Gunz,
2002). The findings of Malti and Keller (2009) as well as Cohen and Gunz (2002)
suggest cultural differences in the knowledge base that individuals access in order to
arrive at emotion attributions. So far such differences have only been documented in
childhood and young adulthood but not in adolescence.
None of the studies that investigated other-evaluative emotions has studied the
relation between self-evaluative and other-evaluative emotions so far. It is thus unclear to
what extent self- and other-evaluative emotions are coordinated, whether this
coordination is a developmental process and whether the correlation between self-
evaluative and other-evaluative emotions is moderated by culture or not. Therefore, if
culture plays a moderating role in regard to people's obligatoriness (both prosocial and
moral actions are considered more obligatory in collectivist cultures, whereas people in
individualist cultures consider more personal discretion in acting prosocially), a stronger
correlation between self- and other-evaluative emotions might be obtained in collectivist
cultures when people transgress a prosocial rule. However, a weaker correlation between
self- and other-evaluative emotions might be found in individualist cultures. In other
words, self- and other-evaluative emotions can be expected to be more differentiated in
individualist cultures, in particular in prosocial contexts, where action is considered
discretionary rather than strictly obligatory.
Purpose and Hypotheses
The present study examined moral emotion expectancies in a cross-cultural context
by comparing adolescents and young adults from Canada and China. As described above,
very little research has been done on adolescents' emotion expectancies in a cross-cultural
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context in a developmentally sensitive way regarding age differences. The study was
meant to explore this largely unknown territory. It combined three different bodies of
literature that have been largely separated in the past: first, findings on cross-cultural
differences in interpersonal responsibilities and moral obligations; second, research on
context specificities in positively versus negatively charged self-evaluative moral
emotion expectancies, and third, research on cultural commonalities and differences in
other-evaluative emotions.
The major goal of the study was to understand cultural differences in peoples'
anticipated emotions when facing moral and prosocial actions or transgressions. The
study examined positively charged self-evaluative emotions (e.g., pride and satisfaction)
and negatively charged self-evaluative emotions (e.g., shame and guilt); positively
charged other-evaluative emotions (e.g., respect and admiration); and negatively charged
other-evaluative emotions (e.g., contempt and anger) in both prosocial and moral (i.e.,
j
obligatory) contexts in cultural comparisons of Chinese and Canadian adolescents and
young adults. While doing so, the study paid particular attentions to age differences and
age as a potential moderator of the proposed relationships. Specifically, the following
hypotheses were tested:
(1) Context specificity of positively versus negatively charged SELF-evaluative
emotions in cross-cultural comparison. As described above, a) it was expected that
Chinese adolescents would view prosocial actions as more obligatory than Canadian
teenagers, whereas no cultural differences were expected in the evaluation for strictly
obligatory actions. These different perspectives on prosocial actions are assumed to have
implications for cultural differences in emotion expectancies of self-evaluative emotions.
N
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In both cultures, b) positively charged self-evaluative emotions (pride and satisfaction)
should be anticipated as a consequence of prosocial actions, c) This tendency, however,
should be more marked in the Canadian sample than in the Chinese sample. For
negatively charged self-evaluative emotions (guilt and shame) a reverse effect was
expected in the context of prosocial actions, d) Thus, failing to act prosocially should
trigger stronger negatively charged self-evaluative emotions in the Chinese sample than
in the Canadian sample. By contrast, e) no cultural differences are expected in the context
of strictly obligatory moral actions. In this context, similar to the findings reported by
Krettenauer and Johnston (2009), f) negatively charged self-evaluative emotion
expectancies when failing to act morally were expected to be stronger than positively
charged emotions when acting morally in both cultures.
(2) Context specificity of positively versus negatively charged OTHER-evaluative
emotions in cross-cultural comparison. As outlined above it was assumed that the
distinction between discretionary and obligatory moral actions plays an important role in
other-evaluative emotions as well. It was expected that cultural differences in other-
evaluative emotions mirror self-evaluative emotion expectancies. In both cultures,
positively charged other-evaluative emotions (admiration and respect) should be
anticipated as a consequence of prosocial actions. This tendency, however, should be
more marked in the Canadian sample than in the Chinese sample. For negatively charged
other-evaluative emotions (anger and contempt) a reverse effect was expected in the
context of prosocial actions. Thus, failing to act prosocially should trigger stronger
negatively charged other-evaluative emotions in the Chinese sample than in the Canadian
sample. By contrast, no cultural differences were expected in the context of strictly
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obligatory moral actions. In this context, negatively charged other-evaluative emotion
expectancies when failing to act morally were expected to be stronger than positively
charged emotions when acting morally in both cultures.
(3) Relationship between self-evaluative and other-evaluative emotion
expectancies. Culture is expected to be a moderator in the relation of self- and other-
evaluative moral emotion expectancies. As long as both Canadian and Chinese
participants consider an action as a transgression of a moral rule, a significant correlation
is expected between self and other-evaluative moral emotion expectancies in obligatory
contexts. However, a weaker correlation between self- and other-evaluative emotion
expectancies is predicted in prosocial contexts, for the Canadian sample, as Canadian
participants are more likely to view prosocial actions as a matter of personal choice.
People may expect themselves to act prosocially but may not generalize this expectation
to others. A different trend is expected for the Chinese sample. In the prosocial context,
there should be a stronger correlation between self- and other-evaluative moral emotion
expectancies in the Chinese sample than in the Canadian sample, as Chinese participants
view prosocial actions as more morally obligatory for self and others. This tendency
might be amplified by the general tendency of Chinese participants to attribute emotions
from the perspective of a generalized other which means that differentiation between self-
evaluative and other-evaluative emotion expectancies may be more marked, whereas
Canadian participants are expected to rely more strongly on egocentric projections, which
means that less distinction between self- and other-evaluative emotion expectancies may
be applied. As a consequence, self and other-evaluative emotions, overall, can be
expected to be more strongly correlated in the Chinese sample because less distinction
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between self and other perspective would be made in Chinese sample than Canadian
sample theoretically.
In addition to testing these hypotheses, the present study explored age differences
in self- and other-evaluative emotion expectancies, even though systematic age
differences in adolescents' self-evaluative emotion expectancies have been rarely
documented so far. In general, adolescent development very often is multi-directional and
more strongly influenced by individual differences as well as contextual factors. This
makes it much harder to detect general, age-related differences (Moshman, 2009). Still,
Krettenauer and Johnston (2009) reported a slight significant decrease in positively
charged self-evaluative emotion expectancies that was attributed to the development of
the moral self. Similar age differences might be found with regard to other-evaluative
emotion expectancies, as there might be a general trend in adolescents to be more tolerant
and less evaluative of other people's behaviour (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2009). It is an
open question whether similar effects can be observed in a cross-cultural context.
Method
Participants
The sample included 179 Canadian and 193 Chinese adolescents from grade levels
7-8, 10-11 and Is -2nd year university. Approximately 60 people were recruited for each
age group and culture. As seen in Table 1, approximately equal numbers of participants
were obtained in each gender, culture and age-group. The participants ranged in age from
1 1.50 to 29.5 years (Mage = 15.84, SD = 2.95). The majority of Canadian participants {n
= 165; 92.2%) were Caucasian and identified themselves as European Canadian (e.g.,
Canadian-German, -Serbian, -Scottish. 6% identified themselves as Latino-Canadian. 5%
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identified themselves as Canadian-Asian e.g. (Canadian-Singaporean or -Vietnamese.
2.2% identified themselves as African Canadian. Ethnicity in the Chinese sample was not
assessed because schools from which participants were recruited are ethnically
homogeneous.
For all analyses involving age, grade levels seven and eight were combined into a
single age group representing junior teenagers (n = 125, Mage= 12.86 years, SD = 1.03).
Students from grade levels 10 and 1 1 were pooled to represent senior adolescents (« =
1 17, Mage= 16.75, SD = 1.052). 1st and 2nd year university students represented young
adults in = 120, Mage = 19.75, SD = 1.048).
For the Canadian sample, senior and junior high school participants were recruited
from consenting schools in the Waterloo region and were paid $10 each for their
involvement in the study. University participants were students of introductory
psychology classes who received either course credit or $10 for their participation. For
the Chinese sample, teenage participants were recruited from Daqing No. 1 Secondary
School, Da Qing, Hei Long Jiang. Chinese university participants were recruited from
first year Introductory Psychology at Northern-East Normal University in Chang Chun. It
is not appropriate to compensate students individually in China according to Chinese
cultural practice, so compensation of CAD $300 was given for each Chinese school that
participated in this study. After providing informed consent, participants were required to
complete a written questionnaire.
Da Qing is a medium-sized, prefecture level city (21,218.73 km ) located in the
north of China. The population is 2,733,584. Chang Chun (20,571.06 km2) is the capital
of Ji Lin Province. The population is 7,459,463. Both cities are moderate in level of
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westernization because of the location (inner cities). These two cities, Da Qing and
Chang Chun, are comparable to the Kitchener/Waterloo area in social and economic
respects. The majority of people are middle class, blue and white-collar workers. The
sample from Northern-East Normal University in Chang Chun is similar to the sample
from Wilfrid Laurier University in terms of educational level. Northern-East Normal
University is an educational and research institution. Students who graduated in
psychology from Northern-East Normal University mostly become teachers or
researchers.
Measures and Procedure
Scenarios. A total of 16 vignettes were used, describing everyday situations in
which a moral norm is either regarded or disregarded. The situations described moral
conflicts that people are typically faced with in everyday life (e.g., deciding whether or
not to help someone who is hurt, wanting to steal a desirable item one cannot afford).
Two different contexts (moral and prosocial contexts) were varied in this story design.
Two different evaluations (self and other) were varied as well: self as an actor was
considered for self-evaluations; self as an observer was considered for other-evaluations.
Two different actions (regarded and disregarded) were varied in the vignettes. Thus, the
vignettes followed a 2 actions (regarded vs. disregarded) ? 2 situational contexts (moral
versus prosocial) ? 2 evaluations (self- vs. other-evaluation) design. For each situational
context two scenarios depicting two different norms were used (prosocial: donating of
money to a charity campaign and helping another person who is in need of physical
assistance; moral: stealing an item from a store and cheating in an academic context). The
1 6 scenarios were presented in a randomized and counter-balanced order. There were
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thus two parallel versions of the questionnaire with two separate sets of scenarios. Within
sets, order of scenarios was randomized. The first eight stories and the second eight
stories were flipped over in the second version of the questionnaire. Note that regarded
and disregarded stories were strictly parallel. Thus, for each vignette describing an action
where a moral norm was disregarded, there was a parallel story depicting the same
situation characteristics with a different outcome (regarded). Two samples of vignettes
are presented and the full questionnaires are in appendix B:
"Imagine, while you are strolling through a small store you see a tiny thing you
really would like to have. However you don't have enough money to buy it. For a
moment you consider taking the object without paying, but then you decide not to do it.
So you leave the store empty handed . . ." — (moral, self-evaluation and regarded).
"Imagine, you are riding the bus on your way home from school, while you notice
another student on the other side of the road crashing into a barrier and falling offher
bike. It looks like the student really hurt herself. At this moment one of your classmates
comes by with her bike. It seems like she is in a hurry. So, she drives past without
stopping ..." — (prosocial, other-evaluation, disregarded).
Emotion ratings. Following the vignettes, participants were asked to indicate how
they would feel about themselves in the self-evaluative situation, and how they would
feel toward the other person in other-evaluative situations. Overall, participants were
asked to rate ten different emotions (satisfied, angry, embarrassed, sad, guilty, proud,
shameful, admiring, contemptuous (looking down on others), and respectful) on a 9-point
scale (1 = not at all to 9 = very strongly). In addition, the response option 0 = not
applicable, was given. Moreover, the overall emotional experience was assessed by
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asking participants to rate how they would overall feel about themselves or about the
other person in each situation using a 5 -point Likert type scale, ranging from 1 = very bad
to 5 = very good. Scores of negatively charged emotion expectancies were reversed that
the strength of emotion expectancies could be both positively charged and negatively
charged. The measure is similar to the one used by Krettenauer and Eichler (2006) and
Krettenauer and Johnston (2009). For overall emotion ratings in self-evaluations,
averaged across all disregarded scenarios and cultures and thus reflecting overall strength
of negatively charged moral emotion expectancies, the grand mean was M = 4.08, SD =
0.662. Averaged ratings for all regarded scenarios and cultures reflecting positively
charged moral emotion expectancies were slightly lower, with a grand mean of M = 3.97,
SD = 0.656. For overall emotion ratings in other-evaluations, averaged across all
disregarded scenarios and thus reflecting overall strength of negatively charged moral
emotion expectancies, the grand mean was M= 3.98, SD = 0.658), Averaged ratings for
all regarded scenarios, reflecting positively charged moral emotion expectancies were
slightly higher, with a grand mean ofM= 4.04, SD = 0.662).
The dependent variables in these analyses consisted of emotion expectancies with
regard to various discrete emotions, as well as overall ratings. Two different strategies
were used to assess positively versus negatively charged moral emotion expectancies.
First, two discrete emotions that clearly represented the type of emotions under interest
were selected. For positively charged self-evaluative emotion, these were pride and
satisfaction, r = .672; for negatively charged self-evaluative emotions, these were guilt
and shame r = .627. For positively charged other-evaluative emotions, these were
admiration and respect r = .701, whereas for negatively charged other-evaluative
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emotions, contempt and anger were used, r = .407. Ratings for each of these two
emotions were averaged and used as dependent variables in the main analyses. They most
specifically represented the emotions of interest. However, they might be overly specific
in some instances. As argued by Krettenauer and Johnson (2009), individuals might
experience emotions other than pride or guilt in a self-evaluative way (e.g., sadness or
anger). People also might experience emotions other than admiration or anger in the
other-evaluative way. To compensate for this limitation of emotion specific ratings, the
study in addition used participants' overall ratings following a moral or prosocial action.
The main independent variables of the test were situational context (moral versus
prosocial), type of action (disregarded vs. regarded) and culture (Canadian versus
Chinese). In addition, age-group (Grade 7-8, 10-1 1, 1st- 2nd year university) was used as
a between-subject factor.
Domain ratings. Three more questions were given to assess participants' view
whether a particular situation depicts a moral obligation, a matter ofpersonal discretion
or a societal expectation (convention). The original assessment for such domain
distinctions was first developed in Miller and Bersoff (1992)'s study, based on an
interview procedure. This measure was adapted to a questionnaire format in Jia et al. 's
(2008) study. In Miller's original study (Miller & Bersoff, 1992), the conceptual
categories regarding whether the behavior under consideration was governed by an
obligation above rule or law, was legitimately regulated, or was both were as follows: (a)
behaviors regarded both as governed by an objective obligation and as legitimately
regulated were considered moral issues, (b) behaviors regarded as not governed by an
objective obligation yet legitimately regulated were considered social conventions, (c)
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behaviors regarded as governed by an objective obligation but not legitimately regulated
were considered personal-moral concerns, and (d) behaviors regarded as neither governed
by an objective obligation nor legitimately regulated were considered matters of personal
choice.
However, in the context of the present study these questions were modified by
directly asking participants whether they (a) thought in this situation people are morally
obligated, (b) have a personal choice or (c) should do what society expected them to do.
The first question was "In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated not to
steal/not to cheat/to help and to donate? Response options ranged on a 5 point scale from
1 = not at all obligated to 5 = very strongly obligated. The second and third questions
were "In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do?" and
"In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do?"
Participants had to choose one answer ranging from 1 = yes, absolutely, to 5 = no, not at
all, with 3 = not sure in between.
The horizontal/vertical individualism and collectivism scale (Triandis, 1995).
Theoretically, Triandis (1995) argued that it is multidimensional, although the
individualism-collectivism in different cultures is indubitable. He proposed that both
individualism and collectivism may be further modified as either emphasizing equality
(Horizontal) or hierarchy (vertical). This V-H dimension represented the idea of how the
individual sees him/her as different and unequal with members of the in-group.
According to the horizontal dimension, one's self is more or less like every other.
Individuals who are high on the horizontal dimension would emphasize equality and
believe that everyone should have equal rights and status. In contrast, the vertical patterns
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emphasized that one's self is different from other's selves. Individuals who are high on
the vertical dimension, would emphasize hierarchy and accept social order and inequality.
Thus, the combination of those relative emphases with individualism and collectivism
produced four distinct patterns.
Several researchers have investigated the validity of the distinctions for the four
cultural patterns in both individualist and collectivist cultures. Singelis, Triandis,
Bhawuk, and Gelfand (1995) used attitude items to measure the four patterns and
provided preliminary support for the validity of the four subscales in factorial analysis
using a sample of American university students. Triandis and Gelfand (1998) also found
the four factors appeared in a Korean sample by using both attitudinal and scenario-based
measurements. Furthermore, these four subscales were extensively used to distinguish the
individualism and collectivism in previous literatures. Chiou (2001) found that Taiwanese
and the Argentine samples were more vertically collectivist than the U.S. sample. The
U.S. sample was more horizontally individualistic than the Argentine sample, which in
turn, was more horizontally individualist than the Taiwanese sample. Consistently, Soh
(2002) also found that the U.S. students were more HI and the Singapore Chinese
students were more VC. Therefore, in the present study, only Horizontal Individualism
and Vertical Collectivism subscales were purposely selected as cultural comparisons.
In the present study, the Horizontal/Vertical individualist and collectivist scale was
used to determine the cultural patterns in Canadian and Chinese sample. Participants
filled out a 32 item cultural-orientation scale. Following Triandis' conceptualization, four
types of cultures can be identified: (1) Horizontal Individualism (HI-uniqueness), where
people strive to be unique and do their own thing; (2) Vertical Individualism (VI-
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achievement oriented), where people want to do their own thing and strive to be the best;
(3) Horizontal Collectivism (HC-cooperativeness), where people merge themselves with
their in-groups; and (4) Vertical Collectivism (VC-dutifulness), where people submit to
the authorities of the in-group and are willing to sacrifice themselves for their in-group
(Triandis, 1 995). Although this typology was initially proposed to facilitate between-
culture comparisons, it was also used to understand variations in individualism and
collectivism within a culture. Each item in the subscales is rated on a 5 point Likert scale,
ranging from strongly disagrees to strongly agree. Measures tapping the cultural
orientations included statements such as "I'd rather depend on myself than others" (HI),
"It is important that I do my job better than others" (VI), "If a co-worker gets a prize, I
would feel proud" (HC), and "Parents and children must stay together as much as
possible" (VC). Reliabilities of Cronbach's alpha for the Horizontal Individualism,
Vertical Individualism, Horizontal Collectivism, and Vertical Collectivism were as
follows: .58, .72, .67, and .59.
Cultural Appropriateness
Overall, several steps were taken to ensure the cultural appropriateness of the
research materials in the Chinese context. The materials were examined for cultural
suitability by both Chinese and Canadians and were revised, if necessary. Finally, two
culture-specific versions of the questionnaire were prepared for use in the Chinese and
Canadian samples respectively. These versions differed only in minor details: ethnicity
was not assessed in the Chinese sample because it was assumed that all Chinese
participants are native Chinese and there were no foreign immigrants in the sample;
Chinese names like "Xiao Hong" (a typical girl's name) were used in the Chinese version
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of the questionnaires but "Lucy" was used in the English version. Native Mandarin
Chinese speakers who were fluent in English translated the Chinese version of the
research protocols into Mandarin Chinese. The translators were thoroughly instructed
regarding the desired connotations of the terms to be used and were directed to use
familiar words that would be readily comprehended by teenage participants. The
materials were also subjected to back translation to guarantee that the meaning of the
original English version of the forms was preserved.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
In the first step it was investigated to what extent major assumptions made in this
study could be empirically corroborated. The first theoretical assumption was that
Chinese participants on average should score higher in both Vertical (VC) and Horizontal
(HC) Collectivism whereas Canadian participants were expected to score higher in both
Horizontal (HI) and Vertical (VI) Individualism. Second, it was assumed that Chinese
participants consider prosocial actions as more obligatory and less discretionary relative
to Canadian participants. A similar difference was not expected for moral actions that
involve negative obligations (not stealing, not cheating).
Cross-cultural differences in collectivism versus individualism
First, it was checked whether the Chinese and Canadian samples differed with
regard to various aspects of the individualism vs. collectivism distinction. According to
Triandis' conceptualization (Triandis, 1995), four types of cultures can be identified: 1)
Horizontal Individualism (Uniqueness) where people strive to be unique; 2) Vertical
Individualism (Achievement) where people strive to be the best; 3) Horizontal
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Collectivism (Cooperativeness) where people merge themselves with their in-groups; 4)
Vertical Collectivism (DutiMness) where people submit to the authority of the in-group.
For this analysis, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, using the four
Individualism-Collectivism scales as dependent variables. It was expected that Chinese
participants on average should score higher in both Vertical (VC) and Horizontal (HC)
Collectivism. By contrast, Canadian participants on average should score higher in both
Horizontal (HI) and Vertical (VI) Individualism. These expectations were partially
confirmed. There was a significant overall main effect of culture, F (4, 363) = 41.26,;?
< .001. Univariate F-tests revealed a significant difference between the two cultural
groups for Horizontal Individualism (HI), F (1, 363) = 49.71, ? < .001 (item means in the
subscale: MChi = 3.35, SD = .54, MCan = 3.73, SD = .49). Inconsistent with the predictions,
however, Chinese participants scored higher on the Vertical Individualism subscale, F(I,
363) = 51.02, ? < .001 (MChi = 3.24, SD = .51, MCan = 2.79, SD = .69). There was no
significant effect of culture for the Horizontal Collectivism (HC), F(I, 262) = .41, ?
= .52 001 (Meni = 3.95, SD = .44, MCan = 3.92, SD = .53). There was a significant
difference for the Vertical Collectivism (VC), F (1, 363) = 54.56, ? < .001 (MChj = 3.57,
SD = .50, Mean = 3.18, SD = .52). These findings confirm the results reported by Jia et al.
(2008) that a high vertical individualism was found and no significant differences in
horizontal collectivist subscale were found among Chinese university students. And these
findings also replicated Chiou (2001)'s study that compared U.S. and Taiwanese
participants. Even though Chinese participants scored higher on the Vertical
Individualism than Canadian participants, a scale that strongly reflects motivation to
succeed, and even though no difference in social cooperation was found (HC),
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differences in uniqueness (HI) and dutifulness (VC) orientation support the view that
Chinese participants overall have a more collectivistic cultural orientation.
Cross-cultural differences in ratings of scenarios
In the second step, it was tested whether domain ratings of the various scenarios as
used in the present study conformed to theoretical expectations. Theoretically, it was
expected that actions depicting a cheating or stealing situation would be rated more
obligatory than stories about making a donation and helping someone. The reverse trend
was expected for the rating of personal discretion. Thus, prosocial actions (donating and
helping) should be considered more discretionary than moral actions (cheating and
stealing). In addition, an interaction of culture with domain was expected so that
prosocial actions would be rated as more obligatory and less discretionary in the Chinese
sample. To test for these differences, a mixed-model ANOVA was run with context
(moral vs. prosocial) and rating (obligation and personal discretion) as within-subject
factors, and culture (Chinese vs. Canadian) as a between subject factor. As summarized
in Table 2, tests of significance revealed significant main effects of cultures, contexts,
ratings, and as well as a two-way interaction between context and rating, a two-way
interaction between rating and culture, and a three-way interaction among culture, context
and rating. As expected theoretically, moral actions were rated more obligatory than
prosocial actions (Mmorai =3.96, SD = .85, Mprosociai = 3.46, SD = .80). However, it was
not significant that prosocial contexts were considered more a matter of personal
discretion than moral contexts (MproS0ciai =4.08, SD = .97, Mmorai = 3.97, SD = .70). A
closer inspection of the cell means of the three-way interaction, together with univariate
F-tests, revealed that the Chinese sample rated prosocial contexts as more obligatory than
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Canadian sample, F (1, 368) = 127.24, ? < .001, and less discretionary, F(I, 368) = 5.05,
? = .02 (see Table 3 for cell means). Moreover, Chinese sample rated moral contexts as
more obligatory, F (1, 368) = 77.54, ? < .001, but no culture difference was found in
personal discretion ratings, F (1 , 368) = 1 .84, ? = . 1 8. Thus, the theoretical assumptions
of cultural differences in domain ratings were consistent for the ratings of obligatoriness
of prosocial actions. Prosocial actions were considered more obligatory by Chinese
participants as compared to Canadian participants.
Main Analyses
Positively versus negatively charged self-evaluative emotion ratings
As demonstrated by the preliminary analyses, Chinese adolescents view prosocial
actions as more obligatory than Canadian teenagers. This different perspective on
prosocial actions is assumed to have implications for cultural differences in expectancies
of self-evaluative emotions. It was expected that positively charged self-evaluative
emotion expectancies as a consequence of prosocial actions should be stronger in the
Canadian sample than in the Chinese sample. This tendency; however, should be reversed
in negatively charged self-evaluative emotions when failing to act prosocially.
First, context specificity of positively versus negatively charged self-evaluative
emotions was analyzed by a mixed model 2x2x2 ANOVA, with context (moral and
prosocial) and type of action (disregarded and regarded) as within-subject factors and
culture (Chinese and Canadians) as a between-subjects factor. In a second analysis, age-
group was included in the same analyses in order to test whether cross-cultural
differences are consistent across age-group or not. Two Separate ANOVAS were
conducted, first one with specific ratings for pride and satisfaction (averaged) and guilt
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and shame (averaged), and another with overall positive versus negative ratings as
dependent variables, respectively.
Specific emotion ratings. It was expected that positively charged self-evaluative
emotions (pride and satisfaction) would be anticipated as a consequence of prosocial
actions in both cultures. This tendency, however, should be more marked in the Canadian
sample than in the Chinese sample, whereas negatively charged self-evaluative emotions
(guilt and shame) should be stronger in the Chinese sample as a consequence of the
failure to act prosocially. No cultural differences were expected in moral contexts.
Table 4 summarizes the findings of the three-way ANOVA with context (moral vs.
prosocial), action (disregarded and regarded) as within-subject factors and culture
(Chinese vs. Canadian) as the between subject factor for specific self-evaluative emotion
ratings as the dependent variable. Main effects of culture and context were both
significant, whereas the main effect of action was not. Overall, Canadian participants
expressed both positively and negatively charged specific self-evaluative emotions more
strongly than Chinese participants, regardless of the two contexts and actions (Mcan =
6.61, SD = 1.82, Mew = 5.85, SD = L76). Participants expressed stronger emotions in
moral contexts than prosocial contexts, regardless of culture and action (Mmorai = 6.35,
SD = 1 .99, Mprosociai = 6. 12, SD = 1 .80).
In addition, there was a strong two-way interaction between context and action.
Theoretically, in moral contexts, negatively charged self-evaluative specific emotions
when failing to act morally were expected to be stronger than positively charged specific
emotions when acting morally. Moreover, in prosocial contexts, a reversed relationship
was expected. People should feel more positively charged self-evaluative specific
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emotions when acting prosocially than negatively charged self-evaluative specific
emotions when failing to act prosocially. As evidenced in table 5, in moral contexts,
participants scored higher in ratings of shame and guilt in disregarded action than their
average score for pride and satisfaction in regarded actions, t (367) = 8.55,/? < .001. In
prosocial contexts, participants scored lower in ratings of shame and guilt in disregarded
actions than pride and satisfaction in regarded actions, t (369) = 12.22, ? < .001. From the
same table, it was found that failing to act morally triggered stronger negatively charged
self-evaluative specific emotions than failing to act prosocially, t (368) = 13.55,/» < .001.
In contrast, acting prosocially triggered stronger positively charged self-evaluative
specific emotions than positively charged emotions for acting morally, t (368) = 8.60, ?
< .001. Therefore, the theoretical expectation of the interaction between context and
action are fully supported.
However, this interaction between context and action was further moderated by
cultural differences, as evidenced by a significant three-way interaction between culture,
context and action. Figure 1 shows the mean scores of the three-way interaction for
specific self-evaluative emotion ratings. It was expected that acting prosocially should
trigger stronger positively charged self-evaluative specific emotions in the Canadian
sample than in the Chinese sample. A reverse relationship of negatively charged self-
evaluative emotions was expected for failing to act prosocially. Figure 1 demonstrates
that Canadians on average scored slightly higher than Chinese in ratings of pride and
satisfaction when acting prosocially. However this difference was not significant, / (369)
= .96, ? = .34. Moreover, deviating from our theoretical predictions, Chinese on average
scored significantly lower on shame and guilt ratings than Canadians when failing to act
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prosocially, t (369) = 5.15, ? < .001. In addition, inconsistent with our prediction in moral
contexts, Canadians scored higher in both regarded, t (368) = 5.98,/» <.001; and
disregarded actions t (368) = 2.94,/?=.004 in moral contexts.,
The same analyses were run including age-group as a second between-subject
factor in order to explore whether cross-cultural differences are consistent across age-
group or not. The findings of this analysis are summarized in Table 1 of the Appendix A.
The effect of age-group was not significant overall, neither the two-way interaction
between age-group and culture, nor the 4-way interaction among culture, age-group,
context and action. Thus, all effects described above are consistent across the three age
groups.
Overall ratings. Turning to overall self-evaluative emotion ratings, a mixed-model
3-way ANOVA was conducted, with context (moral vs. prosocial), action (disregarded
and regarded) as within-subject factor and culture (Chinese vs. Canadian) as the between
subject factor, using the overall self-evaluative emotion ratings as the dependent variable.
As evidenced in Table 6, main effects were found for both culture and action. By
contrast, neither the main effect Of context, nor the interaction between context and
culture, nor the interaction between action and culture were significant. Similar to the
specific emotion ratings, Canadians expressed stronger positively and negatively charged
overall self-evaluative emotions than Chinese regardless of context and action (MCfl„ =
4.12, SD = .56, Mem = 3.93, SD = .51).
Similar to the specific emotion ratings as well, a strong two-way interaction
between context and action was found. As evidenced in table 7, in the moral context,
participants scored higher in overall negatively charged self-evaluative emotion ratings in
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disregarded scenarios (failing to act morally) as compared to positively charged self-
evaluative emotion ratings in regarded scenarios (acting morally), i (370) = 13.79,/?
< .001 . By contrast, in prosocial contexts, participants scored lower in negatively
charged overall emotion ratings in disregarded scenarios (failing to act prosocially) as
compared to positively charged overall emotion ratings in regarded scenarios (acting
prosocially), t (370) = 9.1 1, ? < .001. As demonstrated in Table 7 as well, failing to act
morally triggered stronger overall negatively charged self-evaluative emotions than
failing to act prosocially, t (370) = 14.55, ? < .001. By contrast, acting prosocially
triggered stronger overall positively charged self-evaluative emotions, t (370) = W.61, ?
< .001 as compared to acting morally.
Most importantly, a significant three-way interaction among culture, context and
action was found (see table 6). As evidenced in Figure 2, cross-cultural differences on
overall emotion ratings were consistent with the specific emotion ratings. Canadians
tended to score higher on overall positively charged self-evaluative emotion ratings than
Chinese when acting prosocially. However, this difference was not significant, / (369) =
.82,/? = .42. This pattern was expected theoretically. However, in contradiction to our
expectations, Chinese participants scored lower on overall negatively charged self-
evaluative emotion ratings than Canadian participants when failing to act prosocially, t
(370) = 4. 1 9, ? < .00 1 . In addition, inconsistent with our prediction in moral contexts,
Canadians scored higher in both regarded, / (369) = 3. 13, ? = .002, and disregarded
scenarios, t (369) = 3.44, ? = .001 in moral contexts. Thus, overall emotion ratings
replicated the findings regarding specific emotion ratings in self-evaluative emotion
expectancies.
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The same analyses were run including age-group as a second between-subject
factor in overall ratings of self-evaluative emotion expectancies in order to explore
whether cross-cultural differences are consistent across age-group or not. As evidenced in
Table 2 of the Appendix, similar results were found to the specific emotional rating: a
main effect of age-group was not significant, neither as the two-way interaction between
age-group and culture, nor the 4-way interaction among culture, age-group, context and
action. Therefore, cross-cultural differences were consistent across the three age-groups
in overall self-evaluative emotion expectancies.
Positively versus negatively charged other-evaluative emotion ratings
It was expected that cultural differences in other-evaluative emotion expectancies
should mirror self-evaluative emotion expectancies in both specific and overall ratings.
Therefore, it was predicted that in both cultures, positively charged other-evaluative
emotions (admiration and respect) are anticipated as a consequence of prosocial actions.
This tendency, however, should be more marked in the Canadian sample than in the
Chinese sample, whereas negatively charged other-evaluative emotions (anger and
contempt) should be more marked in the Chinese sample as a consequence of prosocial
actions. Moreover, no cultural differences were expected in moral contexts.
To test these expectations, first, context specificity of positively versus negatively
charged other-evaluative emotions was analyzed by a 3 -way mixed model ANOVA with
context (moral and prosocial) and type of action (disregarded and regarded) as within-
subject factors and culture (Chinese and Canadians) as the between-subject factor. In a
second analysis, age-group was included in order to test whether the cross-cultural
differences were consistent across age-group or not. Two separate ANOVAS were run
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with specific ratings for admiration and respect (averaged) and anger and contempt
(averaged), and with overall positive versus negative ratings as dependent variables,
respectively.
Specific emotion ratings. Table 8 summarizes the findings of the ANOVA with
context (moral vs. prosocial), action (disregarded and regarded) as within-subject factors
and culture (Chinese vs. Canadian) as the between subject factor as well as the specific
other-evaluative emotion ratings as dependent variables. In general, overall expressions
of other-evaluative specific emotions were not differentiated cross-culturally because the
main effect of culture was not significant. However, main effects of context and action
were found to be significant. Participants were more likely to have stronger other-
evaluative emotions in regarded actions than in disregarded actions, regardless of context
and culture (Mregarded = 5.65, SD = 1.65, Mdisreg = 5.04, SD = 1.69). In addition, the
pattern for the other-evaluative emotion expectancies showed that people expressed
stronger emotions in prosocial than moral contexts, regardless of cultures and actions (M
prosocial = 5.98, SD = 1.44, Mmora, = 4.71, SD = 1.63).
Moreover, other-evaluative emotion expectancies mirrored the self-evaluative
emotion expectancies in the two-way interaction between context and action. Table 9
revealed that the two-way interaction between context and action was statistically
significant. As evidenced in Table 9, in moral contexts, participants expressed stronger
negatively charged other-evaluative emotion expectancies when people failed to act
morally than positively charged other-evaluative emotion expectancies when they acted
morally, t (369) = 13.23,/? < .001. In contrast, in prosocial contexts, participants scored
lower in ratings of anger and contempt for the specific emotion when failing to act
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prosocially than their scores of admiration and respect when acting prosocially, t (369) =
26. 61, ? < .001. From the same table, it was found that failing to act morally triggered
stronger negatively charged other-evaluative specific emotions than failing to act
prosocially, t (368) = 13.25, ? < .001. In contrast, acting prosocially triggered stronger
positively charged other-evaluative specific emotions than acting morally, t (368) =
29.34, ? <.001.
However, this interaction between context and action was moderated by culture
since the three-way interaction among culture, context and action was significant (see
table 8). Figure 3 shows the mean scores of the three-way interaction for the specific
other-evaluative emotion ratings. It was expected that acting prosocially should trigger
stronger positively charged other-evaluative specific emotions in the Canadian sample
than in the Chinese sample. A reverse effect of negatively charged self-evaluative
emotions was expected for failing to act prosocially. Figure 3 demonstrates that
Canadians on average scored slightly higher in ratings of admiration and respect than
Chinese, but the difference was not significant, t (368) = .25, ? = .81. Following our
predictions of disregarded contexts, the Chinese sample on average scored significantly
higher in ratings of anger and contempt than did Canadian sample in other-evaluative
emotions when the person failed to act prosocially, t (369) = 5.61, ? < .001, as well as
when he/she failed to act morally, t (369) = 4.84, ? < .001. In addition, inconsistent with
our prediction in moral contexts, Canadians scored higher as positive emotions when the
other acted morally, t (369) = 5.41, ? < .001. Therefore, even though these findings in
other-evaluative emotion expectancies were only partially mirrored by self-evaluative
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emotion expectancies, the findings were consistent with our hypotheses in disregarded
actions but not for regarded actions.
The same analyses were conducted including age-group as a second between-
subject factor in specific ratings of self-evaluative emotion expectancies in order to
explore whether cross-cultural differences were consistent across age-group or not (see
Table 3 of the Appendix A). The main effect of age-group was not significant; neither
was the two-way interaction between age-group and context, nor the two-way interaction
between age-group and culture, nor any 3 -way, 4-way interaction among culture, age-
group, context and action. However, we found a significant two-way interaction between
age-group and actions. Univariate F-tests showed a significant effect on disregarded
scenarios, F (2, 368) = 14.17,/? < .001, but not on the regarded scenarios, F (2, 368) =
2.55,/? = .08. Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni t's showed that 7-8 graders expressed
stronger overall other-evaluative emotions than 10-1 1 graders (D = .88, ? < .001) and 1st-
2nd year university students (D = 1 .05, ? < .001). But there were no significant changes
between 10-1 1 graders and ist-2nd year university students (D = .12, /j = 1.00). (Table 4 of
the Appendix A)
Overall emotion ratings. Turning to overall other-evaluative emotion ratings, a
three-way mixed model ANOVA with context (moral vs. prosocial), action (disregarded
vs. regarded) as within-subject factors and culture (Chinese vs. Canadian) as between-
subject factor for overall other-evaluative emotion ratings as the dependent variable was
used. Main effects were found for cultures, contexts, and actions. Table 10 demonstrates
the significance levels of each effect. Consisted with self-evaluative emotion
expectancies, Canadian participants overall attributed stronger emotions than Chinese
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participants in overall other-evaluative emotion expectancies (Mcan = 4.1 1, SD = .51, M
Chi = 3:91, SD = .45). Similar to the specific other-evaluative emotion ratings, participants
were more likely to report stronger emotions in regarded actions than in disregarded
actions regardless of context and culture (Mregarded = 4.04, SD = .47, Md¡sreg = 3.98,
SD= .48). In addition, opposite to self-evaluative emotion expectancies, but similar to the
specific other-evaluative emotion ratings just discussed, prosocial contexts triggered
stronger emotion expectancies than moral contexts, regardless of cultures and actions (M
prosocial = 4.1 8, SD = .41, Mmora, = 3.85, SD = .48).
Similar to the specific other-evaluative emotion ratings and mirroring self-
evaluative emotion expectancies, a strong two-way interaction between context and
action was found. As evidenced in table 1 15 in moral contexts, participants scored higher
in overall negatively charged other-evaluative emotion ratings in disregarded scenarios,
as compared to positively charged other-evaluative emotion ratings in regarded scenarios,
t (370) = 18.67, jc < .001. By contrast, in prosocial contexts, participants scored lower in
negatively charged overall emotion ratings in disregarded scenarios as compared to
positively charged overall emotion ratings in regarded scenarios, / (370) = 28.54, ? < .001.
As demonstrated in Table 1 1 as well, failing to act morally triggered stronger overall
negatively charged other-evaluative emotions than failing to act prosocially, t (370) =
19.04, ? < .001. By contrast, acting prosocially triggered stronger overall positively
charged other-evaluative emotions, t (370) = 29.53, ? < .001, as compared to acting
morally. Finally the three-way interaction between culture, context and action turned out
to be non-significant.
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The same analysis was run including age-group as a second between subject factor
in order to explore whether cross-cultural differences are consistent across age-group or
not. As evidenced in Table 5 of Appendix A, a significant main effect of age-group was
found. Post-hoc tests of Bonferroni revealed that 7-8 graders expressed stronger other-
evaluative emotions than ist-2nd university students (D = .12, ? = .031) but did not differ
from 10-11 graders (Mio- p =4.01) (D = .06, ? = .58). There was a significant two-way
interaction of age-group and culture, as well. Table 6 of Appendix A shows those
participants who were from grade levels 10-11 and ist-2nd year university expressed
stronger overall other-evaluative emotions in the Canadian sample than the Chinese
sample. Interestingly, a general decrease with age was presented in the Chinese sample,
whereas this tendency was less strong in the Canadian sample. Moreover, a two-way
interaction between age-group and action was significant (Table 7 of Appendix A) and
the results replicated the interaction of age and action in specific other-evaluative
emotion expectancies. Univariate F-tests showed a significant age effect on disregarded
scenarios, F (2, 368) = 16.81, ? < .001, but not on the regarded scenarios, F (2, 368) =
2A0,p = .12. Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni showed that 7-8 graders expressed stronger
overall other-evaluative emotions than 10-11 graders (D = .24, ? < .001) and lst-2n year
university students (D = 31, ? < .001). But there were no significant changes between
10-11 graders and ist-2nd year university students (D = .067, ? = .66).
Relationship between self- and other-evaluative emotion expectancies
Culture was expected to be a moderator of the relation of self- and other-evaluative
emotion expectancies. As long as both Chinese and Canadians consider an action as a
transgression of a moral rule, a significant correlation was expected between self- and
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other-evaluative emotion expectancies. However, a weaker correlation between self- and
other-evaluative emotion expectancies was expected in prosocial contexts for the
Canadian sample, as they viewed prosocial actions more as a matter ofpersonal
discretion. To analyse the relationship between self-evaluative and other-evaluative
emotion expectancies in both prosocial and moral contexts while taking culture as a
moderator into account, two separate regressions analyses were run. First, self-evaluative
emotions functioned as predictors of other-evaluative emotions along with culture
(dummy-coded). In the second step, an interaction term of self-evaluative emotions with
culture was included in order to test whether culture moderates this relationship in
prosocial or moral contexts. The same type of regression analysis was then run for overall
emotion ratings.
Prosocial contexts. The regression of other-evaluative specific emotion ratings
on self-evaluative ratings and culture (1= Chinese, 2 = Canadians) yielded an R2 of .34, F
(2, 366) = 93.07,/» < .01. Self-evaluative emotion ratings predicted other-evaluative
emotion ratings with a standardized ß-weight of .56, / = 12.88,/? < .01. In addition,
Canadians reported less other-evaluative emotions than Chinese, ß-weight of -.30, t = -
6.84,/» < .01. Including the interaction between self-evaluative emotion and culture in the
second step of the analysis did not yield a significant increase in the variance accounted
for, AR2 = .001, AF(I, 367) = .81,/? = .37. Thus, the prediction of other-evaluative
emotion from self-evaluative emotion in prosocial contexts was not different for Chinese
and Canadians.
Similar findings were obtained for the regression for overall other-evaluative
emotion ratings on self-evaluative emotion ratings. Self-evaluative emotion ratings and
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culture predicted other-evaluative emotion ratings, yielding an R2 of .26, F (2, 368) =
64.60, ? < .01. Again, self-evaluative emotion ratings predicted other-evaluative emotion
ratings with a standardized ß-weight of .50, t = 10.93,/? < .01. In contrast to specific
emotion rating, there was no cultural difference on other-evaluative emotions, ß = .06, t =
130, ? = .19. Including the interaction between self-evaluative emotion and culture in the
second step of the analysis did not yield a significant increase in the variance accounted
for, AR2 = .00, AF (1, 367) = .14, ? = .71. Thus, in contradiction to the theoretical
predictions, there were no cultural differences in the relation between self-and other-
evaluative emotion expectancies in both specific and overall emotion ratings.
Moral contexts. The regression of other-evaluative specific emotion ratings on
self-evaluative ratings and culture (1= Chinese, 2 = Canadians) yielded a R2 of .28, F (2,
365) = 70.15,/? < .01. Self-evaluative emotion ratings predicted other-evaluative emotion
ratings with a standardized ß-weight of .54, / = 12.88,/? < .01. In addition, Canadians
reported slightly less other-evaluative emotions than Chinese, with a ß-weight of -.09, t =
-1.99, ? = .05. Including the interaction between self-evaluative emotion and culture in
the second step of the analysis did not yield a significant increase in the variance
accounted for, AR2 = .006, AF (1, 364) = 3.03, ? = .08. Thus, the prediction of other-
evaluative emotions from self-evaluative emotions was not differentiated in moral
contexts between Chinese and Canadians.
However, different findings were obtained for the regression of overall other-
evaluative emotion ratings on self-evaluative emotion ratings. Self-evaluative emotion
ratings and culture predicted other-evaluative emotion ratings, yielding a R2 of .30, F (2,
368) = 78.93, ? < .01. Again, self-evaluative emotion ratings predicted other-evaluative
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emotion ratings with a standardized ß-weight of .48, t = 10.67, ? < .01 . In contrast to
specific emotion ratings, Canadians reported more overall emotions on other-evaluative
emotions, ß = .18, t = 4.1 \,p < .01. Moreover, including the interaction between self-
evaluative emotion and culture in the second step of the analysis did yield a significant
increase in the variance accounted for, AR2 = .02, AF (1, 367) = 10.88, ? = .001. As
indicated in a positive ß-weight of . 1 2, t = 3.30, ? =.001, the association between other-
evaluative and self-evaluative emotion expectancies turned out to be stronger in the
Canadian sample.
Discussion
This research is one of the few studies that have investigated moral emotion
expectancies from a cross-cultural perspective in a Western and an Eastern sample. The
findings support the view that moral emotions are complex and reflect both universal
trends of moral development as well as context specificities (Keller, 2004). This study
also indicates that both cognitive and contextual factors influence moral emotional
expectancies, along with reasoning and judgment. The present study provides an
empirical examination of emotional consequences when people face everyday conflicts in
different types of moral domains in a cross-cultural perspective. That is, persons in their
everyday life do not consider moral obligations as strictly obligatory under all
circumstances, but they take the conditions of the situation into account. In this
discussion, findings are discussed in the following order: first, main effects of context,
action and culture are addressed; second, a consistent interaction between context and
action in emotion expectancies is discussed that was found repeatedly regardless of
cultural differences; third, interactions between context, action and culture for self/other-
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evaluative emotion expectancies are discussed. Fourth, age effects are addressed. Since
these cultural differences turned out to be more complex than expected, the theoretical
framework on cultural differences is extended; finally, limitations and further research
are outlined.
Main trends for culture, context, and action
Two theoretical assumptions that laid the foundation of the present study's
investigation of moral emotion expectancies were confirmed in the present study. First,
Chinese participants scored higher on Vertical Collectivism (Dutifulness) than Canadian
participants, which reflects motivation to submit and comply with authorities of the in-
group. Canadian participants, on the other hand, scored higher on Horizontal
Individualism (Uniqueness) which reflects motivation of being independent and unique.
These cultural differences support the view that Chinese participants overall have a more
collectivistic cultural orientation in terms of dutifulness and a less individualistic
orientation with regard to uniqueness, even though it was also found that Chinese
teenagers strived more strongly to succeed (Vertical Individualism) and there were no
cultural differences in cooperativeness (Horizontal Collectivism). These findings
replicated Jia, et al. (2008), using Canadian and Chinese university students and Chiou
(2001)'s studies using U.S. participants and Taiwanese participants that reported a high
score in the vertical individualist subscale in both cultures, whereas no differences were
found for the horizontal collectivist subscale. This finding corresponds to Bond (1996)
who claimed that China is closer to a mid-point on collectivism-individualism than other
collectivistic cultures.
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Second, consistent with the theoretical assumptions, the hypothesis that prosocial
contexts were considered more obligatory among Chinese teenagers as compared to
Canadian teenagers, but more discretionary by Canadian participants as compared to
Chinese participants was supported. These results suggested that the obligatoriness of
prosocial actions is viewed differently in Chinese and Canadian culture. These findings
were consistent with Miller's (1994) assumption in relationships between interpersonal
moral codes and construal of self in different cultures. She argued that morality is linked
to conceptions of self that are culturally varied between individualist and collectivist
cultures (Miller, 1994). In the independent self, individuals stress personal freedom of
choice as compared to the interdependent self, for which interpersonal obligation is
emphasized. Therefore, individuals who tend toward an independent construal of self
would be more likely to view prosocial commitments as matters ofpersonal decision
making. In contrast, those who tend to be an interdependent construal of self would be
more likely to view the prosocial contexts as mandatory in their interpersonal obligations.
However, the cross-cultural differences for the discretionary rating was not
significant in moral contexts. Both Canadian and Chinese participants rated moral
contexts as equally high in discretion ratings. It may be because of the type of questions
asked in this study. Chinese participants may have interpreted the discretionary questions
in moral contexts as a personal responsibility to act morally. This interpretation is
supported by a slightly significant positive correlation between obligatory and
discretionary ratings in moral contexts in the Chinese sample, r = A5,p- .038, and a
slight but not significant positive correlation in prosocial contexts r = .048, ? = .51.
However, negative correlations between obligatory and discretionary ratings in the
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Canadian sample were found in both moral contexts (r = -.24, ? < .001) and prosocial
contexts (r = -A9,p = .011).
The finding that ratings of obligatoriness and personal discretion for moral actions
do not form a bipolar dimension but are slightly positively correlated deviates from
results reported by Miller et al. (1992). In this study, individuals reasoning about
obligatoriness and personal discretion was assessed in a semi-structured interview.
Responses were classified as reflecting a preference either for moral obligation or for
personal direction with the categories 'personal moral' and 'social conventional' in
between. Thus, a negative correlation between moral obligation and personal choice
could be expected in Miller's et al., (1992) study because participants' responses were
forced into mutually exclusive categories . The present study changed the classification
method into continuous rating scales. As a consequence ratings of moral obligation and
personal choice did not by default represent a bipolar dimension.
In the present study, negative correlations between obligatory and discretionary
ratings in the Canadian sample were found in both moral contexts (r = -.24, ? < .001) and
prosocial contexts (r = -.19, ? = .01 1). However, these negative correlations were not
found in the Chinese sample. These results supported the previous cultural argument that
individualist cultures view moral obligations and personal freedom as mutally exclusive,
whereas this distinction is less pronounced in collectivistic cultures (Miller et al., 1992).
Personal discretion in individualist cultures maybe interpreted as an interpersonal
responsibility in collectivistic cultures. Moreover, individuals from collectivist cultures
may feel obligated to fullfill interpersonal responsibilities. Thus, the distinction between
personal discretion and moral obligation is perhaps less marked in collectivist cultures.
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With regard to moral emotion expectancies general trends were obtained for
context, action and culture. Findings from the present study suggest that self-evaluative
and as well as other-evaluative emotional reactions differ according to contexts, action
and culture. In general, even though no cultural, differences were found for specific other-
evaluative emotional ratings, it was found that Canadian participants expressed more
intense emotions than Chinese participants with regard to all other three emotional ratings
(specific ratings of self-evaluation and overall ratings of self-/other-evaluation) across all
situations and actions. This finding corresponds with cross-cultural research on emotions
demonstrating that people from individualist cultures express and experience more
intense emotions than people from collectivist cultures, perhaps because expressing
strong emotions is disruptive for group harmony (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber & Rie,
2006).
Moreover, a main effect of context was obtained for specific and overall self-
evaluative emotional ratings and for specific other-evaluative emotional ratings. It is
interesting to note that self-evaluative emotional ratings in prosocial and moral contexts
did not follow the same pattern as other-evaluative emotional ratings. In the self-
evaluative specific and overall emotional ratings, participants tended to express stronger
emotions for moral actions. By contrast, prosocial actions triggered stronger emotional
reactions in other-evaluative emotional ratings. It may fit in the theoretical expectation
that moral contexts may trigger stronger reactions toward the self because it would be
more likely to evoke the sense of self or moral self, but less likely to evoke a sense of
others. On the other hand, prosocial contexts may trigger stronger reactions toward others
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because it would be more likely to evoke a sense of commitments between self and
others.
In addition, a significant effect of action was obtained for self- and other-evaluative
emotions. Participants tended to express stronger self-evaluative emotions for moral
failures; whereas, regarded actions triggered stronger emotions for specific and overall
other-evaluative emotions. Participants were more critical of themselves (stronger
negatively charged emotion expectancies in self ratings) when failing to act morally or
prosocially, and more appreciative of others (stronger positively charged emotion
expectancies in others ratings) when observing others acting morally and prosocially.
However, these main effects of context and action need to be considered in light of
significant interactions.
Interaction of context and action
The hypotheses that (a) failing to act morally triggers stronger negatively charged
emotions toward both self and others than positive emotion expectancies when acting
morally and that (b) acting prosocially triggers stronger positively charged emotions
toward both self and others than negatively charged emotion when failing to act
prosocially were supported. There was a consistent interaction between context and
action for both overall and specific self- and other-evaluative emotion expectancies in the
present study. This finding is consistent with research on the so called "actor-effect",
according to which decision makers are seen as more responsible for outcomes when they
are the result of a decision to act actively, as compared to the decision not to intervene
and not to actively pursue an action (Landman, 1987). Previous research has
demonstrated that actions as compared to inactions are more salient when inferring one's
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own and other's attitudes (Fazio, Sherman & Herr, 1982). Applied to moral psychology,
this effect is also known as "omission bias". Individuals judge acts of commission as
morally worse and undesirable than equivalent acts of omission, even when intentions
and outcomes are held constant (Sprance, Minsh & Baron, 1991; Baron & Miller, 2000).
It is also considered to be more immoral when one causes harm by acting rather than not
acting (Ritov & Baron, 1990). Emotional reactions have also been studied in this area.
Researchers found a more intense emotion was attributed to actions than inactions
(Zeelenberg, Pligt, & Vires, 2000).
In the present study, failing to act morally (stealing or cheating) was considered an
action that people decide to take actively. In contrast, acting morally (not to steal or not to
cheat) was considered an in-action where people decide not to transgress a moral rule. In
addition, in the prosocial contexts, acting prosocially (helping or donating) was
considered an active action that people decide to behave prosocially. Conversely, failing
to act prosocially (not to help or not to donate) was considered an in-action. In the present
study, both self- and other-evaluative emotions were stronger in the context of prosocial
actions as compared to moral actions. The reversed trend was found for negatively
charged overall and specific self- and other-evaluative emotional ratings that triggered
more intense emotions failing to act morally than failing to act prosocially. Thus, the
results as regarding to emotion expectancies were consistent with research on the "actor-
effect" both for self- and other evaluative emotions.
Moral emotion expectancies; Interactions with culture
Even though significant interactions between action, context and culture were
found in the present study, the findings regarding cross-cultural differences between
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context and action in self/other-evaluative emotion expectancies indicated that none of
the hypotheses were supported. First, the hypothesis that prosocial actions should trigger
stronger positively charged self/other-evaluative emotion expectancies in the Canadian
sample than Chinese participants was not supported. No cultural differences were found
in either self- or other-evaluative emotional ratings when acting prosocially. Both
cultures attributed strong positive emotions in both self- and other-evaluations for
prosocial regarded scenarios relative to other scenarios.
Second, the hypothesis that no cultural differences in positively charged emotion
expectancies in moral actions should occur was not supported. It was found that Canadian
participants attributed more intense positive emotions than Chinese participants in both
self- and other-evaluative emotional ratings in moral regarded situations. It may be that
Chinese participants are more modest toward themselves and even expect others to be
more modest than themselves as compared to Canadian participants when following
moral rules. Positively charged emotion expectancies were not necessary to attribute
when acting morally in Chinese cultures because of the modesty. It also may be because
those Chinese participants considered moral contexts as more obligatory than Canadian
participants. Thus, this reasoning of obligatioriness may restrain the positively charged
emotion expectancies in Chinese cultures in the moral contexts since they considered
moral actions as mandatory to full-fill their obligations.
Third, the hypothesis that negatively charged self-evaluative emotion as a
consequence of disregarded actions in prosocial contexts should be more marked in the
Chinese sample than Canadian sample was not supported. The present study revealed that
Canadian participants attributed more intensive self-evaluative emotions than Chinese
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participants in situations of failing to act prosocially. This may be explained in terms of
the response bias that Canadians are more accustomed to express their emotions more
openly than Chinese (Takanhashi, Ohara, Antoucci & Akiyama, 2002). In addition, the
same situation can be interpreted differently. Members of individualist cultures
(Canadians) tend to interpret the situations of failing to act prosocially in self-evaluative
terms of individual self-expression and achievement, and thus as situations in which their
independent self is to be affirmed. In contrast, the members of collectivist cultures
(Chinese) tend to interpret the same situations as maintaining a social harmony, so a
strong negative emotional expression could disrupt an interdependent construal of self
(Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Rie, 2006).
Finally, the hypothesis that other-evaluative emotion expectancies should mirror
self-evaluative emotion expectancies was not supported in disregarded situations. The
results of the present study found that other-evaluative emotion expectancies were
opposite to self-evaluative emotion expectancies in disregarded actions in prosocial and
moral contexts. It was found that Chinese participants were more critical towards others
in situations of failing to act prosocially and morally, even though they were less critical
toward themselves than Canadian participants in these situations. These results
correspond with Mesquita and colleagues' results (Mesquita & Haire, 2004; Mesquita &
Markus, 2004), which assessed the appraisals of American and Japanese participants in
different emotional situations in a narrative procedure in a situation where participants
had been offended, humiliated and valued. Those stories were later coded for contents,
including the implications of the situation for other people. The result revealed that in a
negative situation, Japanese were more likely to appraise the situation in terms of its
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meaning for other people. Taken together, the present study suggests that members of
collectivistic cultures are more likely to appraise emotional situations in ways that reflect
concern with the general social implications when they involve other-evaluative emotions
than do members of individualistic cultures that are more likely to appraise emotional
situations in ways reflect self-expression when involving self-evaluative emotions. Thus,
in disregarded actions of moral and prosocial contexts, Chinese have more other-
evaluative negatively charged emotion expectancies than Canadians but this is reversed in
self-evaluative negatively charged emotion expectancies.
Age differences
The cultural differences between contexts and actions in the present study were
consistent across age-group in both self- and other-evaluative emotion expectancies
(Grade 7-8, 10-1 1 and ist-2nd University students), since none of the interactions
involving culture and age were significant. This result replicates findings from the
Krettenauer and Johnston's study (2009) demonstrating that differences between various
contexts were consistent for self-evaluative emotion expectancies across younger and
older adolescents at least in Canada. However, significant interactions between age and
action were found for both overall and specific other-evaluative emotional ratings. For
both cultural groups, older participants felt more positive toward others, since the
strength of the positively charged emotion expectancies increased for the older age group.
At the same time, older participants became less critical of others in disregarded action
contexts. The only cultural difference between age-groups was found for overall other-
evaluative emotional ratings. Canadian participants, in general, attributed stronger overall
emotions in Grade 10-11 and ist-2nd university students than Chinese participants, but this
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difference was not significant for 7-8 graders. Within cultures, a gradual decrease in the
strength of overall other-evaluative emotional reactions was found in the Chinese sample
but not in the Canadian sample. Thus developmental change in adolescents' intensity of
self- and other-evaluative emotions turned out to be context and situation specific.
Whereas the study analyzed the overall relationship between self-and other-
evaluative emotions it did not address possible developmental changes in this association.
Theoretically, the association between self and other-evaluative emotions, was expected
to be stronger in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures (Markus & Kitayama,
1991). This expectation was generally not supported in the present study. Investigating
age-differences in this relations reveals a slight tendency that the association between
self- and other-evaluative emotion expectancies increases whit age in the Canadian
sample but remains stable in the Chinese sample (see Table 8 A).
Extending the theoretical framework
Taking all findings together, it is obvious that the theoretical framework proposed
in the introduction needs to be extended in order to sufficiently account for the results.
Three considerations appear to be particularly important when studying moral emotional
expectancies from a cross-cultural perspective.
First, it was found that Chinese participants expected stronger negatively charged
other-evaluative emotions, but less strong negatively charged self-evaluative emotions
than Canadian participants. These results correspond with the idea that moral and social
rule transgressions are interpreted differently in different cultures. In collectivist cultures,
failing to act prosocially and morally are interpreted as a threat to group harmony.
Whenever a person observes an individual who attempts to disrupt social connection or
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harmony, strong negatively charged other-evaluative emotion expectancies arise. Thus,
the stronger negatively charged emotion expectancies toward others in Chinese
participants suggest a stronger emphasis on social harmony. By contrast, Canadian
participants may view such a situation primarily as a transgression of internalized rules.
Whenever a person observes the same individual in the situation above, it is not necessary
or less likely for the person to have a strong negative view toward this person because of
social harmony. Thus, when others transgressed the rules, less strong emotions are
attributed. However, in the self-evaluative emotion expectancies, when Canadian
participants envisioned themselves transgressing the rules or following the rules, they
would be more likely to interpret this as an inconsistency within the self which in turn
triggers stronger negatively charged or positively charged emotion expectancies relative
to Chinese participants.
Second, in the present study, less strong emotion expectancies were reported by
Chinese participants in both self- and other-evaluations when following moral rules. This
may be because of different cultural norms regarding modesty. Chinese participants
expect themselves to be modest and expect others to be even more modest because overly
positive emotion expressions may create jealousy and be disruptive for group harmony
(Bond, 1996). This cultural norm of modesty seems to influence emotion expectancies in
particular in the Chinese cultural context. Lee and his colleagues have consistently found
that Chinese and Canadian children differ in moral judgments of lying in modesty
situations (Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001): Chinese children gave negative ratings to
individuals who told the truth about their own good deeds and positive ratings to those
who lied about them, whereas Canadian participants did the opposite, suggesting that the
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ratings of the Chinese children reflect the influence of a Chinese cultural emphasis on
self-effacement and modesty (Bond, 1996). In contrast, the ratings of the Canadian
participants reflect a Canadian culture promoting self-confidence and self-esteem,
somewhat similar to that of American children (Bond, 1996).
In Chinese society, the Western egalitarian notion of individual freedom is not
encouraged. The definition of moral rules is focused on whether social cohesiveness and
meeting collective goals (Bond, 1996). When a positive emotion harms group
cohesiveness, it is no longer viewed as morally preferable and is discouraged. Thus, this
culture has different rules concerning which type of emotions should be considered
appropriate and which should not. It has been suggested that the Chinese culture tends to
give priority to the goals and interests of a group over an individual, whereas the Western
cultures tend to give priority to individuals' interests and rights (Bond', 1996). Thus,
individuals in Chinese society are more likely to be modest when acting prosocially and
conforming to moral rules.
Third, both Chinese and Canadians expected equally strong positive self- and other-
evaluative emotions when acting prosocially. Prosocial actions were interpreted as
important in both cultures but in different ways. Chinese considered them as more
obligatory, while Canadians viewed them as more discretionary. Theoretically it was
expected that higher ratings of obligatoriness should lead to less positively charged self-
evaluative emotion expectancies because individuals are less likely to consider this action
as outstanding. However, this theoretical expectation was not supported in the present
study. This may be because both obligation and discretion ratings are important in
individuals' emotion expectancies in prosocial actions. Chinese considered prosocial
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actions as more obligatory which may trigger stronger positively/negatively charged
self/other-evaluative emotion expectancies relative to Canadians who considered these
actions as less obligatory.
Further research/analysis and limitation
The present study is not without limitations arid needs to be extended in various
directions. First, even though the present study used two different methods (specific and
overall emotional ratings) to assess emotion expectancies, and it was found that results
for specific and overall emotional ratings largely corresponded with each other in self-
evaluative emotional ratings, this correspondence was not present for the three-way
interaction between contexts, actions and cultures in overall other-evaluative emotion
expectancies. It may be because the 5 -point rating scales did not allow for an
unconstrained expression ofparticipants' levels of emotion for overall emotional ratings.
In addition, it was found that Canadian participants attributed stronger emotion intensity
than Chinese participants across all emotional ratings which may be because of different
cultural norms regarding emotion expressions. Thus direct comparisons of the mean
scores between the two cultural groups should be drawn only with great caution.
Second, relationship specificity was not varied in the present study but previous
literatures consistently found cultural variations in different relationships between self
and others in interpersonal responsibility such as close friendships (Keller, 2006; Malti &
Keller, 2009), or family members and strangers (Miller & Bersoff, 1992). Research has
also indicated that friendship and parent-child relationships represented quite different
contexts for moral reasoning cross-culturally (Keller, Edelstein, Krettenauer Fang &
Fang, 2005). However, the issue of emotional consequences in different relationships has
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been neglected in this research. Different interpersonal relationships may lead to different
weighting of obligatoriness and constraal of self. For example, obligations may be
considered less important than personal goals in situations involving strangers as
compared to situations involving family members. In addition, the domain of social
convention (what society expects people do) was rarely discussed in the present study. It
is still not clear that what emotions people expected for themselves when they transgress
a conventional rule or what emotions people expected regarding others when they
observe someone transgressing a conversional rule.
Third, although this present study examined both the individualism-collectivism
scale and obligatoriness-ratings in the prosocial domain, the correlation between two
methods has not been discussed. In other words, it needs to be clarified whether higher
scores in the uniqueness of Horizontal Individualist subscale in Canadian sample are
more positively correlated to the view of personal discretion in the moral domain, while
higher scores in the dutifulness of Vertical Collectivist subscale for Chinese sample are
more positively correlated to the consideration of obligation in the moral domain. Post-
hoc analyses revealed a moderate positive correlation between Vertical Collectivist
subscale and obligation ratings in Chinese sample (r = .196) and a moderate positive
correlation between Horizontal Individualist subscale and discretion ratings in the
Canadian sample (r = .187) (see also Table 12). In future analyses, it should be
examined how these two compositions can be combined into one system of cross-cultural
comparisons in moral psychology and how each subscale of individualism-collectivism
and obligatoriness relates to emotion expectancies.
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Last but not least, it needs to be emphasized that the findings did not investigate
gender differences, which is a highly controversial issue first raised by Gilligan (1977).
She claimed that females are more likely to adopt a caring perspective and males are
more likely to assume a justice-oriented stance (Gillian, 1977). However, this claim has
been weakly supported by empirical studies that found few effects of gender. Moreover,
Miller (1994) argued that Gilligan's framework may be criticized for its relative
inattention to culture meanings that may affect gender experiences and that may lead to
variations in significance of gender in different cultural contexts. Future research is
needed to integrate cultural considerations with gender effects. Thus, how gender
differences are patterned in a specific cultural setting and how they maybe manifested in
culturally variable ways are critical to the focus on both, theoretically and empirically.
In sum, the findings of the present study together with the proposed extensions
indicate that investigations of moral emotion expectancies in a cross-cultural perspective
provide an empirical opportunity to systematically combine three bodies of literatures
addressing the cultural construal of the self in terms of the collectivism-individualism
distinction, differences between moral domains and research on moral emotion
expectancies to enhance our understanding of the complexity of individuals' moral life.
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Table 1
Number ofParticipants in Each Culture, Gender and Age-group
Grade Level
University
Gender
Female
Culture
Chinese
Canadians
Total
Grade 7-8 Grade 10-11
Male Female Male Female
32 33
31 29
63 62
33 35
32 27
65 62
-? st ^nd
Male
30 30
30 30
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Table 2
Analysis of Variancefor Obligation
Source
Within Subjects
Rating
Action
Rating ? Action
Error
Between Subjects
Culture
Culture ? Rating
Culture ? Action
Culture ? Rating ? Action
Error
Personal Discretion Ratings
DF FP
1 38.54** .00
1 72.49** .00
1 99.09** .00
368
1 53.77** .00
1 65.76** .00
1 2.95 .09
1 13.16** .00
368
*p< .05. **p<.01.
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Table 3
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Obigatoriness and Personal
Discretion Ratings in Moral and Prosocial Contexts by Culture
Rating
Culture
Canadians
(.62)
Chinese
(.74)
Context
Moral Prosocial
Obligation Discretion Obligation Discretion
3.60(.9O) 3.92(1.01)
4.31 (.62) 4.02 (.92)
3.03 (.69) 4.12
3.87 (.67) 3.98
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Table 4
Analysis of Variancefor Specific Self-Evaluative Emotion Ratings
Source DF F
Within Subjects
Context 1 10.32**
Action 1 3.75*
Context ? Action 1 275.04**
Error 366
Between Subjects
Culture 1 24.04**
Culture ? Context 1 4.07*
Culture ? Action 1 .74
Culture ? Context ? Action 1 29.08**
Error 366
*p< .05. **p< .01.
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Table 5
Average Scores and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Self-Evaluative Specific
Emotion Ratings in Two Contexts and Actions
Contexts
Moral Prosocial
Action
Disregarded 6.82(2.03) 5.49(1.99)
Regarded 5.88(2.03) 6.74(1.81)
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Table 6
Analysis of Variancefor Overall Self-Evaluative Emotion Ratings
Source DF F
Within Subjects
Context 1 .04
Action 1 11.40**
Context ? Action 1 365.46**
Error 369
Between Subjects
Culture 1 19.74**
Culture ? Context 1 .65
Culture ? Action 1 2.00
Culture ? Context ? Action 1 6.43**
Error 369
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 7
Average Scores and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Self-Evaluative Overall
Emotion Ratings in Two Contexts and Actions
Contexts
Moral Prosocial
Action
Disregarded 4.33 (.56) 3.84 (.65)
Regarded 3.73 (.71) 4.21 (.65)
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Table 8
Analysis of Variancefor Specific Other-Evaluative Emotion Ratings
Source DF F
Within Subjects
Context- 1 290.45**
Action 1 42.27**
Context ? Action 1 1004.10**
Error 367
Between Subjects
Culture 1 2.17
Culture ? Context 1 22.63**
Culture ? Action 1 74.42**
Culture ? Context ? Action 1 14.19**
.04
Error 367
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 9
Average Scores and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Other-Evaluative Specific
Emotion Ratings in Contexts and Actions
Contexts
Moral Prosocial
Action
Disregarded · 5.92 (1 .90) 4.46 (1.88)
Regarded 3.80(2.30) 7.49(1.73)
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Table 10
Analysis of Variancefor Overall Other-Evaluative Emotion Ratings
Source
Within Subjects
Context
Action
Context ? Action
Error
Between Subjects
Culture 1 24.43**
.07
Culture ? Context 1 10.59**
.03
Culture ? Action 1 20.57**
.05
Culture ? Context ? Action 1 .69
.00
Error 369
DF F
1 165.65**
1 4.36*
1 1174.55**
369
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 1 1
Average Scores and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Other-Evaluative Overall
Emotion Ratings in Two Contexts and Actions
Contexts
Moral Prosocial
Action
Disregarded 4.28 (.57) 3.68 (.59)
Regarded 3.42 (.73) 4.67 (.49)
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Table 12
Correlation between HlIVC and Moral Domain Ratings in Each Culture
Moral Domain
Obligation Discretion
Overall
HI .214** .111*
VC .311** -.053
Chinese
HI .066 .045
VC .196* -.028
Canadians
HI -.124 .187*
VC .101 -.067
Overall Canadians N = 1 79; Chinese N = 1 93
*p< .05. **p< .01.
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oí
?
H Chinese
¦ Canadian
Prosocial Regarded Moral Regarded Prosocial
Disregarded
Moral Disregarded
Contexts and Actions
Figure 1. Mean scores of specific self-evaluative emotion expectancies. The results show
significant differences between Canadians and Chinese participants in specific self-
evaluative emotional ratings in moral regarded/disregarded, and prosocial disregarded
situations: Canadians attributed stronger specific self-evaluative emotions than Chinese,
but not in prosocial regarded situations.
**p<.01.
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1 5 r
e
o
B
?
>
O
3
2 h
B Chinese ¦ Canadians
Prosocial Regarded Moral Regarded Prosocial Disregarded Moral Disregarded
Contexts and Action
Figure 2. Mean scores of overall self-evaluative emotion expectancies. The results in
overall self-evaluative emotion expectancies confirmed and mirrored the specific self-
evaluative emotional ratings that significant differences between Canadians and Chinese
participants in overall self-evaluative emotional ratings in moral regarded/disregarded,
and prosocial disregarded situations: Canadians attributed stronger specific self-
evaluative emotions than Chinese, but not in prosocial regarded situations.
**p<.01.
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¡1 Chinese ¦ Canadians
Prosocial Regarded Moral Regarded Prosocial Disregarded Moral Disregarded
Contexts and Actions
Figure 3. Mean scores of specific other-evaluative emotion expectancies. The results
show significant differences between Canadians and Chinese participants in specific
other-evaluative emotional ratings in moral regarded/disregarded, and prosocial
disregarded situations. Mirrored to the self-evaluative emotion expectancies, Canadians
attributed stronger specific (positive) self-evaluative emotions than Chinese. However, an
opposite direction was found in specific other-evaluative emotion expectancies as
compared to self-evaluative emotion expectancies in disregarded actions: Chinese
attributed stronger (negative) emotions than Canadians in the situations of falling to act
prosocially and failing to follow moral rules.
**p<.01.
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Appendix A
Table Al: Analysis of Variancefor Specific Self-Evaluative Emotion Ratings Including Age-
group
Source
Within Subjects
Context
Action
Context ? Action
Age-group ? Context
Age-group ? Action
DF
Between Subjects
Culture
Age-group
Culture ? Age-group
Culture ? Context
Culture ? Action
Culture ? Context ? Age-group
Culture ? Action ? Age-group
Culture ? Context ? Action
Context ? action ? age-group
Culture ? Context ? Action ? Age-group
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
10.52**
4.06*
275.34**
1.19
2.95
24.59**
1.42
2.18
3.87
.82
.48
1.43
29.30**
2.39
.13
.00
.05
.00
.31
.05
.00
.24
.11
.05
.37
.62
.24
.00
.09
?2
.27
.01
.43
.01
.02
.06
.01
.01
.01
.00
.00
.01
.08
.01
.00
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table A2: Analysis of Variancefor Overall SelfEvaluative Emotion Ratings Including Age-group
Source DF FP ?2
Within Subjects
Context
Action
Context ? Action
Age-group ? Context
Age-group ? Action
1
1
1
2
2
.06
11.36**
368.58**
1.10
.30
.81
.00
.00
.34
.74
.00
.03
.50
.01
.00
Between Subjects
Culture
Age-group
Culture ? Age-group
Culture ? Context
Culture ? Action
Culture ? Context ? Age-group
Culture ? Action ? Age-group
Culture ? Context ? Action
Context ? action ? age-group
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Culture ? Context ? Action ? Age-group 2
20.33**
2.47
1.90
.57
1.97
.77
2.23
6.41 **
3.05
1.86
.00
.10
.15
.45
.16
.47
.11
.01
.05
.16
.05
.01
.01
.00
.01
.00
.01
.02
.02
.01
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table A3: Analysis of Variancefor Specific Other-Evaluative Emotion Ratings Including Age-
group
Source
Within Subjects
Context
Action
Context ? Action
Age-group ? Context
Age-group ? Action
DF n2
Between Subjects
Culture
Age-group
Culture ? Age-group
Culture ? Context
Culture ? Action
Culture ? Context ? Age-group
Culture ? Action ? Age-group
Culture ? Context ? Action
Context ? action ? age-group
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
164.85**
4.88*
1177.71**
2.63
19.15**
Culture ? Context ? Action ? Age-group 2
2.03
1.39
2.98
21.65**
84.64**
.57
1.97
13.99 **
.85
.95
.00
.03
.00
.07
.00
.16
.25
.05
.00
.00
.57
.14
.00
.43
.39
.31
.01
.76
.01
.10
.01
.01
.02
.06
.19
.00
.01
.04
.01
.01
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table A4
Means and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Specific Other-Evaluative Emotions Rating
among Age-group and Action
Age-group
Grades 7-8 Grades 10-11 lst-2nd University
Action
Disregarded 5.64(1.85) 4.76(1.53) 4.71(1.48)
Regarded 5.36(1.62) 5.71(1.56) 5.87(1.73)
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Table A 5: Analysis of Variancefor Overall Other-Evaluative Emotion Ratings Including Age-
group
Source
Within Subjects
Context
Action
Context ? Action
Age-group ? Context
Age-group ? Action
Between Subjects
Culture
Age-group
Culture ? Age-group
Culture ? Context
Culture ? Action
Culture ? Context ? Age-group
Culture ? Action ? Age-group
Culture ? Context ? Action
Context ? action ? age-group
DF
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
287.66**
48.91**
999.95**
2.38
22.89**
Culture ? Context ? Action ? Age-group 2
30.03**
3.31*
10.49**
10.23**
22.49**
.59
.58
.63
.77
2.26
.00
.00
.00
.09
.00
.00
.04
.00
.00
.00
.56
.56
.43
.46
.11
?2
.44
.12
.73
.01
.13
.10
.02
.05
.03
.06
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table A6
Means and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Overall Other-Evaluative Emotions Rating
among Age-group and Culture
Age-group
Grades 7-8 Grades 10-11 lst-2nd University
Culture
Chinese 4.08 (.36) 3.89 (.30) 3.76 (.32)
Canadians 4.05 (.43) 4.14 (.32) 4.14 (.39)
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Table A 7
Means and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) for Overall Other-Evaluative Emotions Rating
among Age-group and Action
Age-group
Grades 7-8 Grades 10-11 1 st-2nd University
Action
Disregarded 4.16 (.49) 3.93 (.41) 3.85 (.49)
Regarded 3.97 (.52) 4.10 (.43) 4.05 (.47)
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Table A8
Correlation between Selfand Other-Evaluative Specific Emotion Ratings among Age-group and
Culture
Age-group
Grades 7-8 Grades 10-11 1 st-2nd University
Culture
Overall .567 .627 .677
Chinese .628 .649 .639
Canadians .599 .684 .730
\
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Appendix B
How You Feel About Yourselfand Others
• · ·
If you have any questions or concerns related to this questionnaire, please do not hesitate to contact:
Dr. Tobias Krettenauer
Department of Psychology
Wilfrid Laurier University
phone: 519-884-0710 ext. 3894
e-mail: tkrettenauer@wlu.ca
Demographic Information
Before starting with the main part of the questionnaire we need some information about you.
Please provide your personal code:
First two letters in your mother's given name (e.g. MARY)
Your own birthday (e.g. February JJ2, 1991)
First two letters in your father's given name (e.g. DAVID)
P P
P P
P P
You should memorize your personal code because you may need it in the future again.
Please provide the following information:
Year of Birth:
Month of Birth:
Gender: ? female
? male
Grade Level:
Ethnicity: (e.g. Canadian, Canadian-Scottish, Argentinean, Italian, Chinese,
Japanese)
Feelings about Yourselfand Others
On the following pages you find short stories that describe everyday situations as they might
happen to you or someone else. Please read each story carefully. Try to imagine YOU were in
the given situation while you respond to the subsequent questions.
Imagine, while you are strolling through a thrift store you see a tiny thing you really would like
to have. 1 Iowever you don't have enough money to buy it. For a moment you consider taking the
object without paying, but then you decide not to do ¡t. So you leave the store empty handed ...
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
Not at all
1 .—
1 .—
1 .....
1 .....
1 -—
1 -—
1 .—
? .....
? .....
1 .....
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3—
3—
3—
3—
3===
3—
3—
3—
3—
3—
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Moderately
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 --—7
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 -— 7
— 5 6 ----- 7
— 5 6 -— 7
Very Not
strongly applicable
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad-— — bad - - Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to steal? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
¦- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Imagine·, you ars riding the bus on your way borne fro'T school, 'while you notice another
student on the other side of the road crashing into a Darner and falling offner bike, ft looks ¡??e
the student really hurt herself. At this moment one of your classmates comes by with her bike. It
seems like she is in a hurry. So, she drives past without stopping. ...
Think about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
CLASSMATE? (Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3 —
3—
3 —
3 —
3—
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
4 ....
4—.
4...
4 —
4 —
4__.
4_„
4 —
4___
4_._
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
. .. 5 6
5 6
5 6
— 5 6
5 6
5 6
5 6
5 6
Very Not
strongly applicable
7
7
7
7
¦7
¦7
7
¦7
¦7
•7
-- 9
-- 9
-- 9
-- 9
-- 9
-9
- 9
-9
- 9
- 9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad- bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to help? (circle one)
Not at all A bit Moderately Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated obligated obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Imagine, some students from your school ask you to donate money for people in your city who
dont have enough money for medica! treatment. You. think this is realty e good cause. Stili, yeu
decide not to give tnem anything because you need aii your money for a trip you are planning
with your friends for the next weekend ...
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all Moderately
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3 —
3 —
3—-
3—-
3—
3 —
3 —
3—
3—
3 —
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5 6 -
5 6 -
5 6 -
5 6 -
5 6 -
5 6 -
5 6 -
5-—-6 -— 7
5 6 -— 7
5 6 -— 7
Very
strongly
... 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad- bad - Neutral (OK) -— good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to donate? (circle one)
Not at all A bit — Moderately
obligated obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure -— Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circleone)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Imagine, while you are writing a test in class, you see that your classmate wants to copy an
answer fron his textbook. However, all of e sudden, he changes his mirtei., Hs puts the textbook
away and works on the answers by himself . . .
Think about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
CLASSMATE? (Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
— 3
— 3
— 3
— 3
— 3
— 3
— 3
— 3
... 3
— 3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
------ 4
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5..— 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
.... 5 6
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
...7
...7
— 7
Very
strongly
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK)-— good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to cheat? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
-- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
¦ Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Imagine, while you are lining up at the bus stop you notice a schoolmate quickly taking a wallet
out of another person's bag. Tr-en he jumos ori the arriving bus arc drives away leaving the
victim behind ...
Think about YOUR SCHOOLMATE in this situation. How would you feel about
YOUR SCHOOLMATE? (Circle one number for each feeling)
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
Not at ali Moderately
— 2 ----- 3 4 -— 5 6
.... 2 —- 3 4 -— 5 6
— 2 -— 3 4 ----- 5 6
— 2 -— 3 4 -— 5 6
— 2 —- 3 4 -— 5 6
— 2 —- 3 4 -— 5 6
— 2 -— 3 4 -— 5 6
1 2 3 4 -— 5 6
1 ..... 2 3 4 -— 5 6
1 .— 2 -— 3 4 -— 5 6
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
...7
— 7
— 7
Very
strongly
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR SCHOOLMATE in this situation?
(circle one)
Very bad - bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to steal? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
• Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes - Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Im.agiïïç, some students '.? your school co'íect money for children living in your srovirtce who
do not have enough to eat. You realize that one of your classmates donated a large amount of
money even though she had made plans to buy something for herself with this money ...
Think about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
CLASSMATE? (Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all Moderately
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
-- 2
-- 2
-- 2
-- 2
- 2
-- 2
- 2
- 2
-- 2
- 2
3—-
3—-
3 —
3 —
3—
3—
3 —
3—
3—
3 —
- 5 6 --
- 5 6 --
- 5 6 --
. 5 6 --
. 5——6 -
. 5 6 --
. 5 6 --
4_.._. 5 6 -
4..— 5 6 --
4.— 5——6 --
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Very
strongly
... 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad —-- Neutral (OK) -good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to donate? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
-- A bit — ~ Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
¦ Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Imagine, you plan lo travel to a concert of your favorite musical group in a larger city nearby.
To go there, you first need to take the bus to the train station and then catch the train. When you
arrive al the-, bus stop you, find an eidsrly man sitting on ih« bench and gasoing for breath. You
don't know the man personally but you recognize him as someone living in your neighborhood.
Obviously, the man is not doing well and needs medical help. With your cell phone you call an
ambulance. You want to make sure that the elderly person is safe until the ambulance arrives. At
the same time, you know if you don't catch the next bus you will miss your train and therefore
miss the concert. When the next bus comes to the stop you let it drive past . . .
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4 .—
4 -—
4 .—
4 .—
4 _—
4
4
4
4
Moderately
5__— 6 -—7
5 6 -—7
5 6 --—7
5 6 -— 7
5 6 =====7
5 6 —- 7
5 6 -— 7
5 6 -— 7
5 6 -— 7
5„— 6 -— 7
Very
strongly
— 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to help? (circle one)
Not at all A bit —
obligated obligated
Moderately
obligated
Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Imagine, you have a math assignment to hand in tomorrow but you have not started yet. You see
your classmate already has finished this assignment. For a :.T.om.ent, wrier! she is going to the
bathroom you copy the answers. The next day you hand these answers in ...
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
1 —
1 —
1 —
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3—-
3—
3 —
3 —
3 —
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
- 4
Moderately
— 5 6 —
— 5 6 —
— 5-—-6 —
— 5 6 —
— 5 6 —
— 5 6 —
— 5 6 —
— 5_—.g ...
Very Not
strongly applicable
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
-- 9
-- 9
-- 9
-- 9
-- 9
--9
-- 9
„9
.— 7
.— 7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to cheat? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
¦ Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes ~ Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure — Rather no No, not at all
How Do You View Yourself?
On the following pages, you will be presented with ?
not describe you. You will be asked to answer questions about how important these qualities are
to who you are as a person.
It may help to imagine yourself as the picture below when deciding how important you think a
quality is to you. Extremely important qualities are central for yourself, whereas less important
characteristics are more peripheral.
Not Important
to Me
Sort of Important
to Me
Important to
Me
Very Important
to Me
Extremely
Important
to Me
Some qualities will be extremely important to you.
Some qualities will be very important to you.
Some qualities will be important to you.
Some qualities will be sort of important to you.
Some qualities will not be important to you.
Please answer the following questions by checking the appropriate box
1) How important is it to you that you are creative or ânmag:
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
2) How important is it to you that you are considerate or courteous?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
3) How important is it to you that you are hard-working?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
4) How important is it to you that you are honest or truthful?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
5) How important is it to you that you are outgoing or sociable?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important tome
? Not important to Me
6) How important is it to you that you are kind to others or helpful?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
7) How important is it to you that you are athletic or agile?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
8) How important is it to you that you are compassionate or sympathetic?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
9) How important is it to you that you are funny or humorous?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
10) How important is it to you that you are generous or giving?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me ,
? Not important to Me
1 1) How important is it to you that you are logical or rational?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
12) How important is it to you that you are respectful to others?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
1 3) How important is it to you that you are independent or self-reliant?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important tome
? Not important to Me
14) How important is it to you that you are fair to others or just?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
P Not important to Me
1 5) How important is it to you that you are active or emergetie?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
16) How important is it to you that you are responsible or dependable?
? Extremely Important to Me
? Very Important to Me
? Important to Me
? Sort of important to me
? Not important to Me
In the following you find statements about yourself and others. Please read each statement
carefully and indicate whether you agree or disagree by using the following scale:
1 = stromgly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = meifteir disagree mor agree 4 = agree § = strom:
1 . I often do "my own thing". -
2. One should live one's life independently of others. - —
3. I like my privacy. — -
4. I prefer to be direct and forthright when discussing with people.
5. I am a unique individual. —
6. What happens to me is my own doing. - -
7. When I succeed, it is usually because of my ability.
8. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways.
9. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
10. Competition is the law of nature. — -
1 1 . When another person does better than I do, get tense and aroused.
12. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society. -
13. Winning is everything.
14. It is important that I do my job better than others.
15. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. -—
16. Some people emphasize winning; I am not one of them. ~
17. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.
18. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.
19. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.
20. It is important to maintain harmony within my group.
21. I like sharing little things with my neighbors. ^
22. I feel good when I cooperate with others. - -
23 . My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me. -
24. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. — —
25. I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve it. —
26. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.
27. Before taking a major trip, I consult with most members of my family and many friends.
28. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.
29. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.
30. I hate to disagree with others in my group.
3 1 . We should keep our aging parents with us at home. -—
32. Children should feel honored if their parents receive a distinguished award.
Feelings about Yourselfand Others - Part II
On the following pages you find another set of short stories that describe everyday situations as
they might happen to you. Please read each story carefully. Try to imagine YOU were in the
given situation while you respond to the questions.
Imagine, it's the end of the school year and you are having final exams. One morning, on the
way to your school you see an old lady who has dropped her cane and fallen down. You don't
know the lady personally but you recognize her as somebody living nearby in an apartment
building. Helping the woman would make you late for today's exam. So you walk away without
helping ...
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Check one box for each feeling)
Not at all Moderately
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2 —
2 —
2 —
2 —
2 —
2 —
2 —
— 3—
— 3 —
4
4
4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
3 4
- 5 —
- 5 —
- 5 -
- 5 —
._ 5_„
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
===7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
Very
strongly
... 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad— - bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to help? (circle one)
Not at all A bit Moderately Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated obligated obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure —- Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle one)
Yes, absolutely - Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
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Imagine, while you are strolling through a department store, you observe a classmate trying
to steal something. However, a; i of a s-jeden he seems ?? change his mind, Hc puts the object
he was hiding under his jacket back on the shelf and leaves the store without having taken
anything ...
Think about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
CLASSMATE? (Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3—-
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3—
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
4 —
Moderately
5 ...—
5
Very Not
strongly applicable
5 6
5 6
5 6
5 6
5 6
5 6 -— 7
5 6 -— 7
5 6 -— 7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation?
(circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good --Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to steal? (circle one)
Not at all A bit - Moderately
obligated obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
¦ Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes - Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Running head: EMOTION EXPECTANCIES IN ADOLESCENCE 114
Imagine, somebody in your school is collecting money for the homeless who live in your city
and do not have enough to eat. One day she approaches you and asks for a donation. You
think that this charity campaign really makes a difference. Therefore, you give her some
money even though you aiready had made plans on how to spend it . . .
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
Not at all
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3-
3-
3-
3-
3-
3-
3-
3-
¦3-
3-
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Very
strongly
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to donate? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
-- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no —— No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
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Imagine, your friend is taking the same class as you. You both have to hand in an essay
tomorrow in class. However, your friend has not even started yet. Instead he finds an essay in
the internet. He copies this essay and hands it in the next day ,,.
Think about YOUR FRIEND in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
FRIEND?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
1 .—
1 .....
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3—-
3—-
3—-
3—-
3—-
3_„-
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
4.— 5_„
4..... 5 —
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
— 7
===7
— 7
Very
strongly
... 9
... 9
— 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
... 9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR FRIEND in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to cheat? (circle one)
Not at all —- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated obligated
Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes -- Not sure Rather no No, not at all
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Imagine, at a flea market you find a couple of CDs of your favorite musical group you would
like to buy. However, you don't have enough money. So, in a moment when nobody is
watching you, you put the CDs in your bag and leave without [paying . . .
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
Not at all
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3 —
3—
3 —
3 —
3—-
3 —
3 —
3—
3 —
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
4 —_ 5
4=— 5=—.
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Very
strongly
— 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad- bad —- — Neutral (OK)- good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to steal? (circle one)
Not at all A bit Moderately -— Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated obligated obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure — — Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
Running head: EMOTION EXPECTANCIES IN ADOLESCENCE 117
Imagine, you are in your friend's car and your friend is driving to school. You and your
friend notice an old man who has fallen down on the side walk. Your friend stops the car. He
checks if the old man is okay and calls an ambulance even though he is going to be late for
Think about YOUR FRIEND in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
FRIEND?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3 —
3 —
3 —
3—
3 —
3 —
3_—
3—
3 —
3 —
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
Very Not
strongly applicable
4-— 5__
4-— 5-
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR FRIEND in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to help? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
- A bit Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes — Not sure Rather no No, not at all
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Imagine, some people in your school are collecting money for sick children whose parents
don't have enough money for proper medical care. During lunch break they approach one of
your classmates and ask *or a donation. Ever, though your classmate seems tc bs positive
about the cause he does not donate. So the people go away without getting any money from
him ...
Think about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation. How would you feel about YOUR
CLASSMATE? (Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
3 —
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Moderately
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
— 5 6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Very
strongly
... 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Not
applicable
0
.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOUR CLASSMATE in this situation? (circle
one)
Very bad bad Neutral (OK) good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated to donate? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
-- A bit ~ - Moderately
obligated obligated
Strongly
obligated
Very strongly
obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
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Imagine, it is the end of the school year and you have a big project that you have to hand in
tomorrow but you are having trouble getting started. Your cousin had to do the same
assignment the year before and she got a really good grade on the project she harder! in. Ycuir
cousin stiil has her assignment and offers to i et you take It, put your name on lì, and hand It
in. You wonder if you should do it. In the end, you decide to do your own work and you stay
up all night finishing your project. ...
Think about YOURSELF in this situation. How would you feel about YOURSELF?
(Circle one number for each feeling)
Not at all
Satisfied
Angry
Embarrassed
Sad
Guilty
Proud
Shameful
Admiring
Contemptuous
Respectful
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3—-
3—-,
3-....
3—-
3—
3 —
3====
3—
3 —
3 —
Moderately
— 5
.... 5
Very Not
strongly applicable
7
.7
7
7
7
7
- 5 6
- 5 6
- 5 6
4 .— 5 6 -— 7
4_— 5 6 -— 7
4.— 5 6 -— 7
4.— 5 6 -— 7
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
How would you OVERALL feel about YOURSELF in this situation? (circle one)
Very bad - bad Neutral (OK)- -good Very good
In this situation, do you think people are morally obligated NOT to cheat? (circle one)
Not at all
obligated
-- A bit Moderately Strongly Very strongly
obligated obligated obligated obligated
In this situation, do you think it is up to each individual to decide what to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, notatali
In this situation, do you think people should do what society expects them to do? (circle
one)
Yes, absolutely Rather yes Not sure Rather no No, not at all
